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Curtailing Political Interference
The 92d Congress is now considering, for the second time, legisla-
tion that would establish an independent National Legal Services Cor-
poration to administer the nationwide legal services program presently
operated by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).' In its first
session, the Congress passed this legislation, but it was vetoed by the
* This Note draws to a considerable degree on unpublished materials such as letters,
telegrams, reports, memoranda, special investigations, evaluations and notes of the authors.
All such materials are on file with the Yale Law Journal.
1. H.R. 12350, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 3191. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The pro-
visions of these bills with respect to legal services are nearly identical with those of
S. 2007, the legislation passed by the current Congress in its first session. S. 2007, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Each of these bills contains a section (§ 21 of H.R. 12330 and
§ 17 of S. 3191) amending the Economic Opportunity Act of 194 to add a new Title
authorizing the creation of a National Legal Services Corporation. See Economic Oppor-
tunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1970). Sections 1001 to 1016 of H.R. 12350
would create a new Tide X, while §§ 901 to 916 of S. 3191 would include substantially
identical provisions in a new Tide IX. H.R. 12350 was approved by the House of Rep-
resentatives on February 16, 1972, and, as of this writing, S. 3191 has not )et been re-
ported out of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Hereinafter, H.R.
12350 will be cited as "The Bill," with the understanding that unless othenise specified
S. 3191 contains an equivalent provision. The Bill contains a number of other amend-
ments to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1954, similar to those in S. 2007, including a
provision to authorize appropriations to the Office of Economic Opportunity for two
more years. See S. 2007 §§ 2, 3; The Bill §§ 2, 3. Like S. 2007, both would repeal the
existing portions of the law dealing with the OEO legal services program. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2809(a)(3) (1970). See S. 2007 § 1001(b) (2); The Bill § 1016(d). Unlike S. 2007, how ever,
these bills do not have a provision for a Comprehensive Child Development program
and would authorize, instead, an increase in the existing Head Start program. See 42
U.S.C. § 2809(a)(1) (1970).
Passage of S. 2007 in the first session followed a prolonged period of legislative wran-
gling, much of it focusing on the legal services provision. The first major legislative
proposal was submitted by a bi-partisan coalition of Congressmen led by Reprcescntatics
Lloyd Meeds and William Steiger and Senators Mondale and Javits, on March 18, 1971.
See H.R. 6360, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). The Administration submitted its own bill
on- May 5, 1971, accompanied by a Presidential Message on the future of legal services.
See H.R. 8163, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1769, 92d Cong., 1st Sss. (1971). See also
President Richard Nixon, Message to Congress, 7 WtALv. CoMP. P.ES. Doc. 726 (May 5,
1971); Press Conference of Frank Carlucci, Director of the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity, May 5, 1971. The issue which drew most public attention and backstage dispute
was the structure and method of selection of the board of directors. The bi-partisan bill
would have created a board of nineteen members, only five of them appointed by the
President. The Administration bill would provide for an eleven-member board, with
the President appointing all of them. But the bi-partisan coalition also objected
strongly to a number of other provisions of the Administration proposal which they re-
garded as restrictive. See note 159 infra. The two congressional committees-the House
Committee on Education and Labor and Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
-produced bills which they frankly regarded as a "compromise." H.R. REP. No. 92-471,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 32 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPOT]; S. Rrt. No. 92-331,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as SENA'rE REtvoRT]. Each House of Congress
substantially approved the bill reported out by its respective committee, so that further
compromise was necessary in conference to resolve differences between the House and
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President on December 9, 1971.2 The legislation now under considera-
tion, like that previously approved, would transfer authority for the
program to an independent board of directors, appointed by the Presi-
dent according to specified procedures.3 Throughout, the preeminent
purpose of the legislation has been to insulate the program from po-
litical interference, or, as the bill puts it, "extraneous interference and
control."
4
This Note will argue that the establishment of an independent Cor-
poration is only a partial solution to the problem of interference. A
major contributing cause of the program's current vulnerability to
such interference has been a failure of policysetting and responsive-
ness.5 It has been a dual failure: there has been no clear articulation
of policies for projects and personnel to follow; nor has there been a
solution to the problem of defining the proper roles of various constitu-
encies in determining policies. A similar failure in the new Corpora-
tion would continue to be an important factor in causing vulnerability.
In Part I, this Note attempts to show how failures of policysetting and
responsiveness contributed in specific instances to the vulnerability of
individual legal services projects. Part II sets forth a normative analysis
of responsiveness that suggests particular criteria by which control over
Senate versions. Compare H.R. 10351, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), with S. 2007, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971). As embodied in the conference report and approved by Congress, S. 2007
would have created a seventeen-member board, appointed by the President with the
consent of the Senate, with substantial participation in the selection process by various
professional and client groups through the submission of lists of nominees. See note 132
infra. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, 117 CoNC. ReC.
19835 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1971).
2. The major reason given for ,the President's veto was his opposition to Title V hit
S. 2007 authorizing the expenditure of more than $2 billion on Child Development
Programs. Aid to such programs, the President contended, would involve excessive costs
and uncertain benefits. In his veto statement, however, the President sharply criticized
Title IX, the provisions creating a National Legal Services Corporation, noting that it
differed "crucially from the proposal originally put forth by this Administration." The
legislation had lost "the quintessential principle of accountability" and "the door has
been left wide open to those abuses which have cost one anti-poverty program after
another its public enthusiasm and public support." Specifically, the President complained
of restrictions on the Piesident's appointment of board members as "an affront to the
principle of accountability to the American People as a whole." He concluded: "It would
be better to have no legal services corporation than one so irresponsibly structured."
The President's Message to the Senate Returning S. 2007 Without His Approval, 7 WiRLv.
CoMi,. Pars. Doc. 1634 (Dec. 9, 1971).
3. The Bill § 1004(a). See note 132 infra.
4. The Bill § 1001(6). See also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMirrEE ON ExEctrrlvg
ORGANiZATION app. 6 (1970); The President's Message to Congress Proposing Establishment
of the Independent Corporation, 7 WKLY. Compn. I'ais. Doc. 727 (May 5, 1971) ("[I]f we
are to preserve the strength of the program, we must make it immune to political
pressures and make it a permanent part of our system of justice."). The House Report
and Senate Report have identical language in many places on the need for independence.
See, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26-33, and SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
5. See pp. 233-35 infra.
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the program should be apportioned among competing constituencies.0
In Part III, the Note applies this analysis of policysetting and the allo-
cation of political control to three key policy issues facing the pro-
gram: the structure of institutions with responsibility for guidance and
supervision; the eligibility of clients; and the range and mix of services
to be provided.
It should be emphasized that neither adequate policysetting nor a
well-defined allocation of control within the program will eliminate
the motivations for or provide full protection from political attacks.
Those who feel their interests jeopardized or damaged by a legal serv-
ices project are bound to fight back, and it is almost inevitable that a
program of advocacy designed to further the interests of the poor will
impinge on the vital interests of other groups. The measures suggested
here would reduce the program's vulnerability to such attacks by
strengthening its defenses and clearly distinguishing between proper
and improper intervention. In addition, they would enhance the pro-
gram's ability to reach its goals as established by the legislation and
defined by the Corporation.
I. Policysetting, Responsiveness and Political Interference
A. Definitions of Policysetting and Responsiveness
Policysetting may be defined as a concept of management consisting
of five elements: first, the definition of goals and priorities; second, the
articulation of those goals and priorities through coherent standards
and guidelines; third, the reporting of performance data so that the
program may be evaluated in terms of its stated goals and priorities;
fourth, enforcement of standards and guidelines where projects do not
comply voluntarily; and fifth, the precise delineation of responsibility
for each of these tasks.7 Responsiveness is the sensitivity of an institu-
6. Even if the normative analysis of responsiveness advanced here provokes disagree-
ment, it is vital that some method of allocating political control be formulated and
officially adopted in order to create the criteria by which the legitimacy, of claims by
constituencies may be judged. Political interference must be defined and identified on
the basis of some general distinction between proper and improper claims on the
program. No such normative analysis has ever been attempted, even in rough form.
which accounts for the difficulty the program has had in defining "political interference."
7. Policysetting, it should be noted, is given a definition here different from that
in ordinary usage. Normally, the concept might not include elements of enforcement.
review of performance data, or delineation of responsibility. Under the definition adopted
here, it is possible that some of these elements may be accomplished and others not,
resulting in varying degrees of policysetting. For example, a program might fully define
and articulate policies but fail to enforce them. This would be, nonetheless, a failure
of policysetting.
233
The Yale Law Journal
tion to the interests of various constituencies.8 Responsiveness may be
manifested in particular substantive policies, but the most important
step in achieving responsiveness occurs in structuring the governing
boards of the legal services program, both at the local and national
levels. The critical question is what amount and type of representation
should be given to the various competing constituenciesY
In discussing the legal services program, it is useful to distinguish four
constituencies-the professional community (the bar), the community
at large, the client community and the legal services attorneys. 10 By
determining in advance the extent to which a legal services program
should be responsive to these constituencies, one can distinguish be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate claims and demands as they arise.11
8. The concept of responsiveness may be analyzed normatively or empirically. A
normative analysis of responsiveness tells how control of a particular institution should
be allocated to its constituencies. An empirical analysis tells how control actually is
allocated. A failure of responsiveness occurs when a constituency is allocated more or less
control than is warranted by the criteria of a normative analysis. This may occur through
a deficient analysis of the way in which control should be allocated, or by default. Il
the legal services program, the failure has taken both forms. In alleging its failure in
the former sense, this Note uses the criteria suggested by the normative analysis pre.
sented in the next section. See pp. 266-71 inlra.
9. Responsiveness to a particular constituency might be examined in terms of either
outcome or process. The two approaches, however, are closely linked. Indeed, one of the
key indicators of the quality of representation-its effectiveness--is its product, the
policy outcome.
10. These constituencies may be defined in such a way that they are non-overlapphng
interest groups. The client community consists of individuals who are eligible for lega
services, and the legal services attorneys are those lawyers employed full-time by local
projects. The professional community comprises all attorneys who are members of the
bar, with the exception of legal services attorneys. All individuals who are not members
of any one of the foregoing constituencies are members of the community at large. Such
definitions, inevitably, are somewhat artificial, since an individual may regard himself
as a member of more than one constituency, and different members of one constituency
may have significantly different interests. In some cases, there may be questions as to
which constituency a particular member of the board represents-a lawyer, for ex-
ample, may claim to represent the poor while voting with the professional community's
interests. See note 45 infra. As a practical matter, the allegiance of some board members
(and the actual allocation of power within the board as a whole) may be assessed only
by scrutinizing votes and policy outcomes over a significant period. But this method of
making constituency classifications, though more accurate, is simply unworkable. Hence
this Note makes the assumption that classification of individuals by their status is at
reasonable way of reflecting their interests. The experience in the program to date seems
to suggest that this assumption is accurate. Classifications are therefore made here on
the basis of status, but exceptions are noted where they are of potential importance.
For the purpose of defining the client community, the meaning of "eligibility" is
identical to the standard of eligibility adopted by the program to determine which
individuals are qualified to receive service. To be a member of the client community,
an individual need not be an actual recipient; he need only be a potential recipient,
or, in other words, within the outer financial parameters of eligibility. The legislation
supports the adoption of such a status classification. It stipulates, for example, that at
least one third of project governing board members must be "members of the client
community." The Bill § 1006(b)(6). "Member of the client community" is defined as
"any person unable to obtain private legal counsel because of inadequate financial
means." The Bill § 1012(4).
11. The legitimacy of a claim, as discussed here, goes not to the merit of the par-
ticular demand, but rather to the constituency making the claim and the issue as to
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Thus, comparing the two concepts, policysetting applies to the internal
decisionmaking process, while responsiveness pertains to the allocation
of political control of the program among its various constituencies. As
applied to other agencies, both concepts might be subsumed under the
term "accountability." Breaking that term into its two components
affords greater clarity, however, and allows adjustment for the "inde-
pendence" of the Corporation. 12
B. The Present Program and Statute
Legal services are provided under the present program by a network
of local projects which receive yearly grants from the Office of Legal
Services (OLS) in OEO. The bulk of the OLS budget of $60 million
in fiscal year 1970 was devoted to providing such grants to some 293
projects, with approximately 2,200 full-time lawyers serving 500,000
which the claim is made. See pp. 268-71, 279-81 infra. The merit of particular demands,
e.g., whether a particular type of suit should be entertained, is left to political resolution
by the various legal services constituencies whose participation is discussed below. The
legitimacy of a claim is a notion introduced solely to distinguish political interference
(illegitimate) from political intervention (legitimate). Legitimacy, then, does not de-
termine a particular outcome on any policy issue, but only the inputs which should
be taken into account.
12. The independence or autonomy of the National Legal Services Corporation neces-
sitates the concepts of policysetting and responsiveness employed in this analysis. Ac-
countability normally includes the notion of an agency justifying its actions--explaining
past policies and outlining plans for the future-to Congress or the President. The
mechanism through which accountability usually operates is the budget process: requests
for spending authority made to the President (through the Office of Management and
Budget) and to Congress (through the appropriate committee for authorization appropria-
tions) provide the context in which performance is reviewed and policy options presented.
This process would continue to be followed, in form, by the National Legal Services
Corporation. But the President would be prohibited from attempting to control the
Corporation's policy in any way. The Bill § 1013. And, among the limits to its oversight
of the program, Congress would stipulate that the Corporation cannot be expected to
provide information which would abridge "the necessity of maintaining the confidenti-
ality required by the best standards of the legal profession." Id. § 1010(a,b). Implicit
in the bill and frequently stated throughout the legislative history, is the notion that
the kind of accountability required of other agencies could not be demanded of the
Legal Services Corporation. If it were truly independent, the Corporation could not
be called upon to account for its decisions with respect to a particular case or project,
or even many of its more general policy decisions involving judgments of priorities or eli-
gibility. The closest analogy would be the position of the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting (CPB). There, officials have contended that First Amendment rights of grant-
ees would be jeopardized by congressional inquiry into programming decisions, and have
argued that Congress is entitled to only "rough breakdowns in categories of expenditure."
Interview with John Macy, Director, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, in Washington,
D.C., Oct. 15, 1971. They have resisted the idea that the CPB should be accountable to
the Congress, or to the President, in the same manner as other federal agencies. They
have acknowledged, nonetheless, that it must be responsive in some sense to certain
constituencies such as local affiliates, subscribers and, ultimately, its listeners. With
respect to the Legal Services Corporation, a notion of accountability different from the
one normally applied to federal agencies would seem equally desirable. The right to
protection of the attorney-client relationship and the explicit congressional intent that
the Corporation be independent would seem to have the same force as analogous con-
siderations affecting the CPB.
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clients. The OLS also funded various experimental projects, research
activities and volunteer programs.18
The federal program began as an experimental stepchild of the
Community Action program.14 It was not given the status of a separate
branch of OEO until 1969, when President Nixon reorganized the
antipoverty program. At the local level, about ninety per cent of the
projects are still delegate grantees of Community Action Agencies
(CAA's), and their funds flow through these non-profit antipoverty
organizations. At a minimum, delegate status means review by the
CAA of all applications for grants, as well as performance of certain
bookkeeping and management tasks.15
13. Office of Legal Services Research and Development Plan for fiscal year 1971,
April 1970. The program has thus more than doubled in size since fiscal year 1966,
when 526 million was allocated to fund 157 projects with approximately 1,000 lawyers. d.
14. The first legislative authorization for the creation of the Office of Economic
Opportunity, and the so-called War on Poverty, was the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2701-2994d (1970)). Legal Services was initiated by OEO officials under the very gencial
authority provided by Title II of that legislation, relating to the creation and funding
of the Community Action Program. Not until passage of the Economic Opportunity
Amendments of 1966 was Legal Services specifically authorized under § 222(a) of the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. See Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89794, § 222(a),
80 Stat. 1451 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2809 (1970)). The authorization, consisting of one
sentence, mandated the Director of OEO to provide "legal advice and legal representa.
tion" to persons eligible for assistance from OEO "when they are unable to alford tile
services of a private attorney .. . to further the cause of justice among persons living
in poverty." The Director was required to "establish procedures to assure that the
principal local bar associations in the area to be served by any proposed program of
legal advice and representation are afforded an adequate opportunity to review the
proposed program and to submit comments and recommendations thereon before such
program is approved or funded."
15. The relationship between community action agencies and legal services projects
has been subject to increasing dispute as the projects have gained confidence and pressed
for autonomy. Originally, almost all legal services projects received their funds as
delegates of CAA's. The founders of the program, officials of the OEO Community
Action Program, were inspired largely by an article written by Edgar and Jean Cahns
on neighborhood law offices. See Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Per.
spective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964). They chose to ignore the article's warning that legal
services should not be subordinated to the overall strategy (the so-called "military per-
spective") of the war on poverty. Throughout the history of OEO legal services, one of
the most fundamental unresolved issues has been whether the program should serve a
community action strategy for fighting poverty-a strategy planned and directed by
the local CAA for fighting poverty community-wide, mobilizing all the resources and
services available to accomplish its ends. The founders of Community Action saw legal
services as one weapon in the arsenal of the war against poverty, a tool or tactic to be
maneuvered and manipulated or "traded off" in response to political or budgetary pres.
sures in the "larger picture." See R. Blumenthal, The Bureaucracy: Antipoverty andthe
Community Action Program, in AMERICAN POLITICAL INs'rTUTIONS POLICY" 128.80 (A.
Sindler ed. 1969). But legal services attorneys balked at subservience to any higher strategy,
at any level, and pressed for independence from Community Action. Until 1969, the
Director of OLS was a subordinate of the Assistant Director of OEO for the Commtnlty
Action Program. In reorganizing OEO, President Nixon established legal services as a
separate entity on the organization chart and gave the Director of OLS the additional
title of Associate Director of OEO for Legal Services so that he would henceforth report
directly to the Director of OEO. See Statement by the President Outlining Changes in
the Office of Economic Opportunity's Organization, Structure and Operating Procedures,
5 WKLY. CoMp. PREs. Doc. 1132, 1135 (Aug. 11, 1969) ('The sluggishness of many insti-
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According to the current statute, the goal of the legal services pro-
gram is "to further the cause of justice among persons living in poverty
by mobilizing the assistance of lawyers and legal institutions and by
providing legal advice, legal representation, legal counseling, education
in legal matters and other appropriate legal services."10 The only re-
quirements of the statute are that: (I) services must be of a high pro-
fessional quality and must maintain the attorney-client relationship;
(2) the Director of OEO must make arrangements for local and state
bar associations to be consulted prior to funding or refunding projects;
(3) neither funds nor personnel may be used for representation of any
person indicted (or proceeded against by information) for commission
of a crime.17 In addition, the program is subject to requirements in
other parts of the Economic Opportunity Act which pertain to all OEO
programs, particularly provisions which give state governors a quali-
tutions-at all levels of society-in responding to the needs of individual citizens, is
one of the central problems of our time.*). See also The President's Address to the
Nation on Domestic Programs, 5 WNILY. Costp. PREs. Doc. 1103, 1103 (Aug. 8. 1969).
Administrative independence at the national level, however, has not protected legal
services projects from interference by local CAA's. As a number of observers commented,
"'attempted domination of lawyers by Community Action Agencies and officials at various
governmental levels has interfered significantly with the effectiveness of the program.
demoralized many of the bright young attorneys attracted to the program, delayed the
making of crucial decisions and impeded the necessary growth of the legal services
program." Memorandum from Representatives of the ABA and NLADA to the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare, Robert Finch, Feb. 6, 1969, re OEO Legal Senices,
quoted in Hannon, Legal Services and the Local Bars: How Strong is the Bondl 6
CALIF. Wsr. L. REv. 46, 47 (1969). This is confirmed by many present OLS officials and
former directors. Interview with Terry Lenzner, former Director of OLS. in W'ashington.
D.C., Aug. 22, 1971; interview with E. Clinton Bamberger former Director of OLS. in
Washington, D.C., Sept. 2, 1971; interview with Fred Speaker. former Director of OLS,
in Washington, D.C., Aug. 19, 1971; interview with Earl Johnson, former Director of
OLS, in Washington, D.C., Sept. 15, 1971; interview with Dan Bradley. Regional Di-
rector of OLS, Southeast Region, in Washington, D.C., Sept. 16, 1971. See also Hannon.
Legal Services and the Community Action Program: Oil and Water in the War on
Poverty, 28 LEGAL AID BRtEFCASE 5 (1969).
16. This authorization in its present form was contained in the Economic Oppor-
tunity Amendments of 1967, Act of Dec. 23. 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222. 81 Stat. 672
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2809 (1970)). The provision elaborated somewhat on the enumera-
tion of services to be provided, but retained approximately the same statement of goals
as the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1966, Act of Nov. 8. 1966. Pub. L. No.
89-794, 80 Stat. 1472 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2809 (1970)). See note 14 supra. In addition, it
included two significant requirements. One related to the attorney-client relationship:
"Projects involving legal advice and representation shall be carried on in a way that as-
sures maintenance of a lawyer-client relationship consistent with the best standards of the
legal profession." 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(3) (1970). The second was the restriction on repre-
sentation in criminal cases: "No funds or personnel made available for such program
(whether conducted pursuant to this section or any other section in this part) shall be
utilized for the defense of any person indicted (or proceeded against by information) for
the commission of a crime, except in extraordinary circumstances where, after consul-
tation with the court having jurisdiction, the Director has determined that adequate
legal assistance will not be available for an indigent defendant unless such services arc
made available.' Id.
17. Id. The provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and subsequent
amendments pertaining only to legal services have been codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(3)
(1970).
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fied power to veto grants to legal services projects in their states' s and
which require projects to furnish twenty per cent of local costs. 10
C. The Failure of Policysetting: Legal Services Guidelines
The failure of policysetting in legal services has been evident in the
vagueness of policy guidelines and standards, their silence on many
issues, and the uneven nature of their enforcement. The first formal
Legal Services Guidelines were issued in 1965, and were acknowledged
to be vague and unspecific on a number of issues.20 Though there were
subsequent changes in OEO policies on legal services, some discretion-
ary and others mandated by Congress, the Guidelines were never again
revised formally. Officials occasionally issued new interpretations of
policies through OEO Instructions, or Community Action Memo-
randa.2 1 Most often, however, these policy statements were expressed
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2834 (1970). A plan describing any project funded by OEO must be
submitted to the governor within the state for which it has been proposed. The governor
is given thirty days within which to consider it. If the governor vetoes the project, the
Director may implement the project only if he reconsiders and finds it "fully consistent
with the provisions and in furtherance of the purposes" of the antipoverty program.
Originally, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 did not contain tis provision for
overriding a governor's veto by a Director. It was added by the Economic Opportunity
Amendments of 1967. Act of Dec. 23, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 242, 81 Stat. 706 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2834 (1970)). See note 16 supra.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2812(c) (1970). Under this provision, financial assistance to a CAA
or other agency may not exceed eighty per cent of the costs of a project. However, the
director may waive this requirement "if he determines, in accordance with regulations
establishing objective criteria, that such action is required in furtherance of the purposes"
of the antipoverty program. "Non-federal contributions may be in cash or in kind,
fairly evaluated, including but not limited to plant, equipment or services." This pro.
vision was added by the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967. Act of Dec. 23,
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 225(c), 81 Stat. 702 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2812 (1970)). See
note 15 supra.
20, Office of Economic Opportunity, Guidelines For Legal Services Programs (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Guidelines]. Interview with Francis Duggan, Director ol Operations,
OLS, in Washington, D.C., Aug. 21, 1971. In response to many inquiries, OLS officials
said that further written directives would be forthcoming, but in fact few were issued.
Five "overall objectives" are stated in the Guidelines: to provide funds implementing
local programs of advice and advocacy for the poor; to accumulate empirical informa-
tion with respect to experiment and innovation; to sponsor education and research in
areas of procedural and substantive law affecting the poor; to acquaint the bar with
its essential role in combatting poverty; to teach the poor and those who work with
them to recognize problems which can be resolved through law. Guidelines at 1.
21. The legal force of the Guidelines Instructions and Memoranda was never fully
defined. The Guidelines and many of the most important Instructions and Memoranda
were not promulgated as official federal regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) (unless otherwise noted,
the Instructions and Memoranda discussed in this Note have not been officially promtl-
gated); nor has any procedure ever set forth the process of formulation and publication.
Nonetheless. OEO officials considered them in some sense binding on grantees. In case
of violation, the sanctions were primarily suspension or termination of the grant, or
denial of refunding. These sanctions were usually not invoked, however, unless the
grantee refused to take disciplinary action against an offending employee or to correct
abuses and avoid repetition of the violation.
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informally and ad hoc-in letters to individual programs, conditions
on particular contracts and in speeches, articles and working memo-
randa. -2 During the program's first four years, evaluation of projects
was sporadic and followed no uniform criteria. A systematic evaluation
effort was commissioned in 1970 under Director Terry Lenzner, but
the criteria and processes employed by the two major evaluation con-
tractors differed, and were substantially unrelated to the Guidelines.
23
The lack of policysetting has been particularly significant with re-
spect to three major issues: (1) the duties and structure of institutions
responsible for guidance and supervision; '(2) the eligibility for serv-
ices, and (3) the range of permissible services and priorities among
them.
Local governing boards have been the institutions principally re-
sponsible for guidance and supervision. Yet the OLS never specified
the division of responsibility between the local boards and the OLS
itself, or their relationship to CAA's, state and local bar associations,
and their own attorneys. The Guidelines stipulated only that there be
22. The two principal means of policy communication to individual legal services
grantees have been the Evaluation Letter and the Special Condition. The Evaluation
Letter was a summary of criticisms and suggestions made by an outside evaluator team,
sometimes including legal services officials, which wvas sent to the project two weeks
to six months after the evaluation was received by OLS. It was signed by a Regional
Director of OLS or, more commonly after 1970, by the Deputy Director of OLS or by
the Director of Planning, Technical Assistance and Evaluation in the Office of Legal
Services. Often, these letters included the threat of denial of refunding if the project
failed to follow the evaluation's recommendations. But usually, even in cases of projects
rated poor, the possibility of sanctions was stated more obliquely. See, e.g., Letter from
Winston R. Webster, Director, Office of Planning, Technical Assistance and Evaluation,
OLS, to George Wall, Jr., President of the Board of Directors, Delta Legal Aid, Tallulah,
La., Aug. 4, 1971: "Compliance with the recommendations of this evaluation, and in
particular with the special conditions attached to the grant, is extremely important
and must become the basis for a major renewal and strengthening of effort by the Delta
Legal Aid Society.' See note 57 infra. Special conditions could relate to any issue, and
take any form. Often they were communicated to grantees in the evaluation letter.
sometimes when the project was well into its program year.
23. Two companies, Auerbach Associates Inc., and John D. Kettelle Corporation, were
commissioned in 1970 to perform evaluations individually of all existing legal services
projects. Their reports, which are often cited and quoted in this Note, were the only
formal evaluations ever performed on many projects. Both companies used teams of
evaluators, consisting generally of a legal services official, a lawyer from outside the
program, a representative of the client community, and a member of the company's
staff. Each member of the team did separate interviews, recorded the results on a
standard form, and gave their work product to the Kettelle or Auerbach staff member,
who analyzed the results and wrote the report. Neither company drew directly onl
goals stated by the Guidelines. See note 20 supra. Though each company formulated a
standard form for use by its evaluators, the two sets of forms differed in significant
respects. Auerbach, for example, divided program activities into major areas-law reform,
individual case work, community education, economic development, and community rep.
resentation-whereas Kettelle did not. Often the companies covered the same general
areas-relations with the CAA or bar association, for example-but employed different
questions on the standard form. The reports were organized differently and often
written in different styles, the Auerbach documents tending to be longer, more detailed,
and more penetrating.
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an "autonomous policymaking board." 24 In dealing with bar associa"
tions, the Guidelines said that legal services programs should "main-
tain continuing cooperation ' 2r and attempt to "coordinate"' O their
activities, in addition to submitting to the bar copies of applications
for funding or refunding. As to GAA's, the Guidelines noted that "or-
dinarily" the projects would be a "component" of the CAA's, "operat-
ing within" them.27 But the Guidelines also required that each project
should "determine its own policy"-insuring, for example, the "inde-
pendence of professional legal judgments" from policies of the local
GAA. 28 No further instructions or guidelines were issued on the ques-
tions of how much independence from the CAA was to be afforded, or
what conditions would justify direct funding of a legal services project
instead of funding as a delegate agency.29
With respect to eligibility, the Guidelines required projects to "de-
scribe the standard by which the eligibility of clients will be deter-
mined."' 0 This "standard" was reviewed by the OLS prior to funding.
But OLS did not specify which body or individual at the local level
should have responsibility for proposing and revising such standards.
Nor did it formulate criteria by which the acceptability of the stand-
ards would be determined.3' OLS maintained that the general OEO
standard on poverty income levels did not apply to the program, and
24. Guidelines, supra note 20, at 4.
25. OEO Instruction No. 6140-1, June 13, 1969, 45 C.F.R. & 1061.2-1 (1971). By this
instruction, the bar associations are given twenty days in which to review a proposal
submitted to them, and forward "any comments or recommendations" to OEO.
26. Guidelines, supra note 20, at 1.
27. Guidelines, supra note 20, at 2, 3.
28. Guidelines, supra note 20, at 3.
29. A "special appeals procedure" was set forth in Community Action Memorandum
No. 9-A, to be used by a "local agency, public or private, which desires to undertake
one or more components of a community action program but has found after first
applying to the CAA serving the community that it is impossible or infeasible to com-
bine its efforts with those of the CAA." Community Action Memorandum No. 9-A, Pt.
B(3), Feb. 21, 1967, re Revised policy on funding of independent community action
programs, appeals procedure, and neighborhood based CAA's. It provided that an
agency "applying under the appeals procedure must submit a letter," along with its
application, "which explains why the applicant believes it impossible or Infeasible to
combine its efforts with those of the CAA." Id. Pt. B(4). The procedure was regarded
as "a virtually useless tool" by OLS officials. Interview with Duggan, supra note 12.
30. Guidelines, supra note 20, at 7.
31. Generally, the project's governing board was regarded as the institution respon.
sible for drafting such standards in the first instance (presumably as part of its "policy.
making" function). Guidelines, supra note 20, at 3. This responsibility, however, was
never formally pinpointed, and the CAA might just as well have been expected to create
guidelines, since it was typically the formal grantee. See pp. 239-40 supra. The Guide-
lines mentioned factors which might be included in the standard: "income, depend-
ents, assets and liabilities, cost of a decent living in the community, and an estimate of
the cost of the legal services needed." Guidelines, supra note 20, at 7. However, the
standards submitted by the projects-and approved by OLS-almost never Included
such factors explicitly.
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cited the provision in the Guidelines that "no standard should be in-
flexible.".32 Standards adopted by governing boards and approved by
OLS consisted simply of income level cutoffs. There were wide varia-
tions among these standards, and major differences between projects in
the same state or region that served areas with similar populations and
local conditions.33 As a matter of unwritten policy, legal services offi-
cials often permitted the eligibility standard to be waived entirely if a
client was unable to secure private counsel.3 4 But the conditions under
which this might be allowed were never defined for the program as a
whole in any form. Nor was there any clear determination of the cri-
teria to be applied in determining the eligibility of groups or of indi-
viduals who might be "voluntarily poor."3 i
There was a similar failure of policysetting with respect to the issue
of services-the questions of what distinction was to be drawn between
permissible and impermissible services, and what priorities would be
established among different types of permissible services. Following
the passage of an amendment in 1967 forbidding criminal representa-
tion,31 a Community Action Memorandum was issued interpreting per-
32. Guidelines, supra note 20, at 7.
33. For example, the Baltimore program had a standard of $3,800 for a family of
four, the one in Washington, D.C., had a cutoff at $5,200. The program in San Jose,
California, established an income level of $2,280, while in San Diego the level was set
at $3,480. These were the standards in use in 1967. Silverstein, Eligility for Free Legal
Services in Civil Cases, 44 J. URw.N L. 549, 562 (1967). OLS officials contended that
eligibility guidelines issued by the Office of Economic Opportunity did not apply to
the projects. The two most important OEO issuances on eligibility were: OEO InsLtc-
tion No. 6004-1, Dec. 27, 1968, and, superceding this document, OEO Instruction No.
6004-la, Jan. 30, 1970, 45 C.F.R. § 1060.2-1 (1971). The Instructions were intended by
OEO officials "to be used for all those OEO-funded programs, whether administered
by a grantee or delegate agency, which use the OEO poverty income guidelines as
admission standards." OEO Instruction No. 60O4-la, supra. The Guidelines contained in
Instruction No. 6004-la set eligibility levels at $1,800 for a non-farm individual, and
$3,600 for a non-farm family of four, with $600 allowed for each additional member of
the family. These Instructions, however, were never accepted by OLS or enforced on
legal services projects.
34. Typically, a legal services attorney was authorized to handle any case for which
he had attempted two or more referrals to the private bar, regardless of other eligibility
standards. Projects differed, however, in the number of referrals required, the system
of referral established, and the individual given responsibility for final acceptance of
the case.
35. See OEO Instruction No. 6004-2, March 22, 1969, 45 C.F.R. § 1060.3-2 (1971).
Entitled "Limitation on Benefits to Those Voluntarily Poor," the Instruction provides
that the program should not serve any individual who is "fully capable of supporting
himself but chooses not to do so," unless the refusal is for "good cause." The question
of what is "good cause" for purposes of this Instruction has never been resolved. The
Guidelines imply that this group should not be provided with free legal scrvices if they
are able to afford a lawyer by "pooling resources." Guidelines, supra note 20, at 7. But
the Guidelines add that "a flexible standard should be applied" involving consideration
of the size of the group and the relative poverty of its members, and additional cri-
teria. Id.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(3) (1970). See note 16 supra.
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missible services to include representation of arrested persons before
indictment or information, in parole revocation and juvenile court
matters, in other specified types of cases and in "extraordinary circum-
stances." 37 The Memorandum acknowledged that numerous important
questions were left unanswered, and promised that a more complete
Instruction would be issued. But no further written guideline or
standard was formulated, and legal services officials in several instances
permitted a certain amount of criminal defense representation to be
carried on.38 Policies pertaining to lobbying were equally uncertain.
An Instruction on lobbying was issued prohibiting any activity which
disrupted the ordinary business of a legislature or which involved
demonstrations, rallies, picketing or forms of direct action aimed at a
legislature. Also prohibited were campaigns of advertising carried on
through the media and mass letter-writing or visitations calculated
to influence legislators. 39 This Instruction, however, failed to clearly
determine the propriety of the most common and important lobbying
activities of projects, largely because of an ambiguous proviso that
restrictions were not to be interpreted to forbid "purely informational
and educational activities."
40
37. Community Action Program Memorandum No. 79 § B(2)(6), Dec. 27, 1967. The
memorandum interpreted the restriction to permit representation of arrested persons
before indictment or information, parole revocation, juvenile court matters, proceedings
concerning bail, alleged mistreatment of prisoners, civil contempt, criminal matters
arising out of civil matters, and other "extraordinary circumstances." This memorandum
began with the words "Pending more detailed instructions . . . ." Such instructions
were never issued. On December 20, 1968, a draft issuance was released for review and
comment to several hundred project directors and other officials. It was vehemently
opposed by a vast majority as being too restrictive. A second draft dated March 27,
1970, was never issued for comment because of opposition to it from the Office of
General Counsel in OEO. "Since the last draft," according to one account, "many others
have been attempted and none has reached the point of being sent out as an Issuance,
As a matter of fact, most have been thrown away in disgust before completion." Memn-
orandum from Steven Draisin, Summer Intern, to Fred Speaker, Director of OLS, Aug.
11, 1971, re Policy Guidelines for Criminal Representation.
38. See description of grant to NOLAC in New Orleans, pp. 253-54 infra.
39. Community Action Program Memorandum No. 66, June 10, 1967.
40. Terry Lenzner informed OEO officials that an improved Instruction on lobbying
was urgently needed, following complaints by Rep. Craig Hosmer with respect to the
lobbying activities of the Legal Aid Foundation of Long Beach. One of the "grey areas,"
he suggested, was the propriety of lobbying activity directed at legislation affectlng the
poor not carried out on behalf of any particular client. Memorandum from Terry
Lenzner, Director of OLS, to Donald Rumsfeld, Director of OEO, Aug. 25, 1970, quoted
in Memorandum from Stephen Schultz, Summer Intern, to Fred Speaker, Director of
OLS, Aug. 6, 1971. No additional guidelines were ever adopted, though Lenzner's sue.
cessor, Fred Speaker, drafted a new set of proposed guidelines on the subject, and dis-
seminated them for comment to various legal services project directors. Memorandum
from Fred Speaker, Director of OLS, July 12, 1971, quoted in Schultz supra.
One report on the adequacy of the existing Guidelines commented: "For the past
five years, legal services attorneys have been engaged in lobbying activities. There have
been little if any national directives encouraging this legislative activity; it has simply
evolved." The report noted that 103 projects were "known to have engaged in some
242
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D. The Failure of Responsiveness
The legal services program never determined how responsive the
program should be to its various constituencies. In the absence of such
a determination, officials have had no basis for policysetting with
respect to the structure and composition of institutions such as local
governing boards. They have had no criteria by which to allocate repre-
sentation, resolve competing claims of constituencies, decide the proper
role of the bar or deal with CAA's. The result has been a lack of policy-
setting on matters involving the allocation of representation and influ-
ence. After the passage of the 1967 OEO amendments, requiring a
minimum of one-third representation of the poor on CAA governing
boards, the OLS required its own governing boards to conform to this
provision.-" In addition, it required a majority of lawyers on most
boards, but this requirement was never articulated in any official form,
nor were more detailed specifications elaborated.42
The lack of policysetting created, in effect, a vacuum into which
groups and individuals, representing primarily the professional com-
munity and community at large, moved to seize control and exert
pressure. At the local level, governing boards of projects have been
form of legislative activity." Schultz supra. It recommended that guidelines be formu-
lated to specifically permit legal services attorneys to contact individuals and groups
and tell them of the effects of proposed legislation, maintain ongoing relationships
with legislators, draft legislation, and perform other activities, the propriety of which
was uncertain. Besides Community Action Program Memorandum No. 66, a number of
OEO Instructions deal with related issues--the application of the Hatch Act (18 U.S.C.
§ 594 (1970)) to OEO employees (OEO Instruction No. 6907-1, Sept. 6, 1968); participation
by employees in unlawful demonstrations, rioting and civil disturbances (OEO Instruc-
tion No. 6907-2, Oct. 21, 1968, 45 C.F.R. § 1069.2-1 (1971)); and employee participation
in "'direct action," such as "picketing, parades, or marches, sit-ins, rallies or assemblies."
OEO Instruction No. 6907-3, Dec. 14, 1968, 45 C.F.R. & 1069.1-1 (1971). See also note 82
supra for a description of difficulties encountered in Albuquerque with respect to
picketing and direct action activities.
41. A provision included in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1967 required that
one third of the members of all CAA governing boards be "representative" of the poor.
See Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, supra note 16, 42 U.S.C. § 2791(b).
See also note 119 infra. In OEO Instruction No. 60051 this provision was interpreted
to apply to the governing boards of all delegate agencies, including those of legal
services projects, as well as the CAA boards. OEO Instruction No. 6005-1, Dec. 1,
1968, Participation of the Poor in the Planning. Conduct and Evaluation of Community
Action Programs, 45 C.F.R. § 1060.1-2(5) (1971). Nonetheless, OLS never specifically
revised or rescinded the Guidelines to take account of the policy. The Guidelines stated
that OLS "does not require a fixed proportion of the people to be served or their
representatives on the policymaking board." Guidelines, supra note 20, at 4. The OEO
Instruction No. 6005-1 "was not something flagged to the attention of legal ser'ices
projects." Interview with Duggan, supra note 20.
42. Interviews with Bamberger, Lenzner, Johnson, Speaker, supra note 14. Members
of boards are chosen in a variety of ways. Lawyer members almost all are appointed,
either by local public officials, the local bar association, or the CLA. The represcntatiaes
of the poor are often elected, and sometimes appointed by CAA boards. Some governing
boards choose their own successors. Often, the lack of any length limit on period of
service allows them to reappoint themselves.
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dominated most often by attorney members.43 Such members are often
selected by officials of the local bar and almost invariably consider
themselves representatives of the bar. They run meetings, formulate
procedures by which decisions are made, chair executive committees,
and usually head the boards.44 Second only to the bar, in terms of local
influence, has been the community at large. Its representatives are "lay
members" appointed by social service agencies, public officials, and the
CAA's. Though such members sometimes claim (or are called upon)
to express views of the client community, almost all owe their primary
allegiance to the community at large.45 In order truly to represent the
client community, it has been increasingly assumed, a representative
must be poor himself. The representatives of the poor, however, are
usually less thoroughly prepared for board meetings and are often
inhibited by the procedures, place and scheduling of the discussion.'"'
The only representative of the legal services attorneys at board meet-
ings is the director of the project, and directors have generally been
barred from voting.
43. One source of the bar's power at state and local levels is the requirement that
the associations be consulted prior to funding of a legal services project. 42 U.S.C. §
2809(a)(3) (1970). See Stumpf, Law and Poverty: A Political Perspective 1968 WIs. L.
Rav. 694. This requirement is applied through OEO Instruction No. 6140.1. See note
25 supra. But the most important source of power has been the bar's participation,
granted formally or informally, in the selection of governing board members. In a
significant number of legal services programs-estimates range from thirty-five to fifty
per cent-bar associations chose a majority of members of the governing board. Inter-
view with Duggan, supra note 20. Informally, regardless of the board structure, they
exercise an important influence in the hiring and firing of employees, the appointment
of a director, and the determination of project policies, particularly regarding eligibility.
In many projects, according to the first Director of OLS, Clinton Bamberger, bar control
was the "price" paid for establishing legal services. "Bar support wasn't absolutely
necessary but we wanted it. Sure we negotiated. We wanted a majority of the board to
be lawyers, though this didn't mean that all the lawyers had to be chosen by the bar."
Interview with Bamberger, supra note 14.
44. Interview with Duggan, supra note 20.
45. The chief executives of social service agencies, whether public or private, have
not been regarded by the poor as true representatives of their interests. Interview
with Jean Cahn, in Washington, D.C., Sept. 16, 1971; and Interview with Maryellen
Hamilton, President of the National Clients Council, in Washington, D.C., Sept. 16,
1971. Such executives may be heads of welfare departments, united funds, or other local
charitable or religious groups. They are selected by officials, or by resigning members
of the board. Legislatively, Congress has recognized that only representatives selected by
the poor themselves can claim to represent this community. See 42 U.S.C. § 2791(b)(2),
(f)(2), (3) (1970). This recognition is articulated even more clearly in the proposed legis.
lation, which stipulates the minimum representation of the poor on local boards In
terms of "member[s] of the client community." The Bill § 1012(4).
46. The domination of lawyers is a frequent complaint of the client community rep-
resentatives, who contend they are "bossed around." Interview with Hamilton, supra
note 45. As one observer has written: "There are many members of the bar who doubt
the poor have much to contribute to the determination of the policies of a legal services
program. . . .They also resist the idea that ethical decisions brought before the board
should be determined in part by laymen. Most programs . .. will be lawyer-run
regardless of whether there are poor on the board." Pye : Cochran, Legal Aid-A
Proposal, 47 N.C.L. Rav. 528, 571 (1969).
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At the national level, the program has been highly sensitive to the in-
terests of the bar-though the bar, at this level, comprises a completely
different set of organizations and officials.4 7 The influence of the
community at large, perhaps equal to that of the bar, is exercised
through particular Congressmen whose demands are usually on behalf
of individuals or groups and relate to a particular project. The bar
and the community at large dominate the National Advisory Commit-
tee (NAG), a consultative body composed primarily of lawyers, ap-
pointed and chaired by the Director of OLS and including the presi-
dent, past president and president-elect of the American Bar Associa-
tion.48 Legal services attorneys have played a significant role on the
NAC, principally through representatives who are sympathetic to their
interests. But the client community has had virtually no representation
on this body and its interests often differ importantly from those of
legal services attorneys.49 A National Clients Council, still in its forma-
tive stages, has been unable to command much influence or to form
alliances with other organizations representing the poor.50
47. The American Bar Association is not related, in terms of membership, control
or organization, to state and local bar associations. The ABA has strongly supported
the program since its founding, but has insisted on a special relationship in return.
This relationship has meant in effect an expectation of a semi-official role in running
the program. In 1969, for example, the ABA insisted on the right to disapprove any
nominee being considered by Donald Rumsfeld, then Director of OEO, for the position
of Director of OLS. Rumsfeld refused to drop Terry Lenzner from consideration, though
the ABA initially expressed reservations with respect to his qualifications, and pro-
ceeded to request his nomination by the President. The ABA continued to play a major
role in the National Advisory Committee, and provided important aid to Lenzner in a
number of instances, such as the fight against the Murphy Amendment. See note 105
infra. See also SENAr REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
48. The procedures involved in the selection and operation of the NAC may vell
violate OEO Staff Instruction 1205-2, which prohibits any of the agency's advisory com-
mittees from being selfsperpetuating. OEO Staff Instruction 1205-.2, Nov. 23, 1971. This
characteristic, however, reflects the assumption that the bar will have a special role on
the NAC:
An important ingredient of the agreement between OEO and the bar was the
establishment of the National Advisory Committee to Legal Services. As ABA Presi-
dent Edward Wright told the subcommittee of Manpower, Employment and Pov-
erty on May 11, 1971: "The National Advisory Committee was later established
pursuant to the understanding between OEO and the bar to assure the continued
cooperation and support of the organized bar and to provide a voice for it in policies
affecting the operations of the program.'
SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 29-30.
49. Legal Services attorneys have been known to place a higher priority on some
issues, such as their own status within the program, that are of less concern to the client
community. Moreover, on certain issues the interests of the attorneys and the poor may
be in direct conflict or at least may be felt to be so. Recently, for example there have
been increasing complaints from clients about attorneys who "exploit" clients to launch
sweeping law reform actions, when the individuals may be seeking much more limited
solutions to their problems within existing laws. The clients accuse the attomeys of
taking law reform "ego trips" at their expense. The National Clients Council has begun
compiling documentation on this problem, and plans to make it a major issue. Interview
with Hamilton, supra note 45.
50. The National Clients Council (NCC) is an organization whose membership is
composed of individuals eligible for free legal services and whose purpose is "to act as
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E. Failures of Policysetting and Responsiveness: Examples of Political
Interference
Although generalizations about political interference are difficult to
make, a common pattern is discernible. Initially, an individual or
group believes that its power or interests are threatened by particular
activities of the legal services project. The individual or group attempts
to forestall or eliminate these activities by controlling the project or
exerting pressure on it. The conflict is thus manifested in a public,
political controversy. When controversy erupts, however, public atten-
tion is focused on some particular policy problem, e.g., the structure
of legal services institutions, eligibility or services, rather than the
broader claim to representation implicit in the position of the chal-
lenging party. The challenging party uses the policy issue as a weapon
against the project or the program as a whole by charging that the
activity in question is improper. This policy issue may trigger other
weapons such as a veto (or veto threat) of the project's grant by the
governor or a cutoff (or threat thereof) of contributions by local or-
ganizations. Often the conflict escalates to the national level, as Con-
gressmen, Senators and federal officials are enlisted on either side.
Officials of the project and OLS attempt to defend the propriety of
the project's activities, but their arguments are undermined by the
ambiguity or absence of standards and guidelines and by a resultant
inability to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate pressures. Their
actions take on the appearance of administrative fiat. The result is
often a decline of self-confidence as project attorneys and bureaucrats,
once-burned, trim their sails. This pattern can be illustrated in the
three major policy areas: guidance and supervision, eligibility, and
services.
a liaison between the poverty community and the lawyers working in legal aid/services,"
National Clients Council Funding Proposal for 1972, submitted with letter from Maryellen
Hamilton to Fred Speaker, June 24, 1971. The NCC had a budget of approximately
$118,000 in fiscal year 1971, funded almost entirely by OEO. In many instances, It
operates as a kind of ombudsman on behalf of the poor. Recently, for example, it stir-
veyed representation of the poor on legal services governing boards and found "many
boards around the country with no clients on them. The Clients are represented by
either attorneys or someone who really cannot speak for the poor." Id. The national
leadership in the NCC is chosen in a series of statewide and regional meetings of client
delegates, who are themselves chosen by the governing boards of local projects. Tile
NCC claims that 2,000 representatives of the poor throughout the United States "par-
ticipate" in the organization. Id. But there have been serious questions as to the
representativeness of the national leadership, and the actual number of clients active
in the organization's affairs. Thus far, attempts to align the NCC with the National
Welfare Rights Organization or National Tenants Council have been unsuccessful. In-
terview with Jean Cahn, supra note 45.
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1. Guidance and Supervision
Two kinds of groups in particular, local bar associations and CAA's,
have attempted to dominate local governing boards or to usurp their
responsibilities for guidance and supervision. Often they have suc-
ceeded, because of OLS' failure to formulate a onception of how po-
litical power should be divided. Had such an allocation been even
roughly determined in advance, some of these demands might have
been resisted. The predominance of bar associations and CAA's has
constituted a failure of responsiveness to other important constitu-
encies.
In Houston, the governing board of the Houston Legal Foundation
(HLF) was composed of prestigious members of the bar and headed
each year by the outgoing president of the Houston Bar Association.
The board refused to permit community education, law reform or
group representation;ai large numbers of applicants were rejected, and
of those accepted at least two thirds were classified as domestic rela-
tions cases. OLS officials recognized that the defects of the project,
described in numerous evaluations, were in large part the result of
responsiveness solely to the professional community, at the expense
of the interests of the poor and the legal services attorneys.52 In at-
tempting to alter the situation, the bargaining position of OLS was
weakened not merely by the ambiguity of guidelines on the substan-
tive issues, but also by the lack of a normative framework according
to which the bar's influence could be labeled excessive. HLF board
members contended that neither the project's policies nor its board
structure violated any written OLS policy or standard. The weak-
ness of the OLS position emboldened HLF, and caused OLS offi-
cials to shy away from a funding cutoff or any other dramatic move
51. These terms have never been officially defined but are commonly used within
the legal services program in evaluations and memoranda. See note 23 supra. Group
representation consists of services provided to an organization or association of low
income individuals who are generally residents of a particular neighborhood or area.
Law reform may be defined as representation provided to a low income group or indi-
vidual with the primary objective of changing a law or legal interpretation affecting
the poor generally and usually involving elemental questions with respect to the dis-
tribution of power or wealth. Such representation is distinguished from individual
casework or service, which has the primary objective of improving the situation of a
low income group or individual under existing law. The two, of course, overlap. But the
two activities are separable in terms of primary objective. For an illuminating discussion
of law reform and legal services generally, see Hazard, Law Reforming in the Anti-
Poverty Effort, 37 U. CH. L. REv. 242 (1970).
52. An evaluation in June 1971, reported that the governing board had "an image
of total control by the Houston Bar Association. Auerbach Associates Inc. Evaluation
Report, the Houston Legal Aid Foundation, May 12-15, 1970. "Until 1969, the governing
board categorically refused to permit any representatives of the poor to sit on that
body." Interview with Duggan, supra note 20.
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which might have precipitated a public confrontation exposing the
lack of policysetting53 The bar succeeded in maintaining its control
for more than four years; the vacillation of OLS ultimately resulted in
a bitter and disruptive climax to the dispute.54
Similar situations occurred in Charlotte, North Carolina,5 Volusia
County (Daytona), Florida, 56 Tallulah, Louisiana," and Baltimore,
53. See Letter from Frank Jones, Deputy Director of OLS, to W. Ervin James, Chair-
man of the Board of Directors of the Houston Legal Aid Foundation, May 30, 1970.
54. Under a threat of a funding cutoff, the governing board reconstituted itself in
1971. Even then, however, the bar continued to exercise substantial indirect influence.
See Auerbach Evaluation, supra note 52. Many OLS officials feel that the National
Office should have moved more decisively, but was constrained from doing so by lack
of standards. "Those were heavy-weight guys on the board and when you go against
them you've really got to have your ducks in a row." Interview with Duggan, supra
note 20.
55. In Charlotte, the President of the Charlotte Mecklenburg Bar Association chose
eight of the fifteen members of the governing board of the project, who in turn chose
the remaining seven as representatives of the target community. The board insisted oil
prior approval of all suits, case by case, and refused as a general matter to allow any
class actions or group representation, or any activities involving economic development
and community education. A limit of $300 was set on all claims, preventing attorneys
from taking actions to the federal district court. The project was "used as a dumping
ground for unwanted cases" by private attorneys, and the caseload consisted In large
part of family relations problems. Auerbach Associates Inc., Evaluation Report, Legal
Aid Society of Mecklenburg County, June 22, 1971. The project was criticized as "weak
and ineffective" by a number of evaluations. OEO, Legal Aid Society of Mecklenburg
County, Evaluation Report, 1969; Auerbach Evaluation supra. Following the firing of
a staff attorney for filing a police brutality suit, OLS officials attempted to persuade
the project to reconstitute the board. A compromise was reached: the board removed
some of the restrictions on project activities, but its membership and method of selection
remained unchanged. Despite the removal of formal restrictions, attorneys are severely
inhibited by the board. They are "young, bright and energetic, but are frightened of
the board's power. . . .They have yet to take on a case significant enough to arouse
curiosity or retaliation from the Board." Auerbach Evaluation supra. Many OLS of-
ficials believe that the national office could have succeeded in altering the structure and
composition of the board if guidelines and standards could have been brought to bear.
Interview with Bradley, supra note 15.
56. When OLS officials demanded that the board of the Volusia County Legal Services
project be reconstituted, as a special condition attached to the 1970 grant, the President
of the VCLS board demanded a hearing on the grounds that "no action by the present
board" had been cited which could be deemed contrary to "standards set out by the
Office of Economic Opportunity." See Telegram from Terry Lenzner to Dan Bradley,
Regional Director of OLS, Southeast Region, Sept. 21, 1970; Letter from Frank Jones
to Bernard Strasser, Chairman VCLS board, Sept. 2, 1970; Letter from Bernard Strasser
to Frank Jones, Oct. 1, 1970. The board, dominated by the bar association, had imposed
low eligibility standards so as to produce a high (thirty per cent) rejection rate; It had
also restricted attorney activities, and provided for segregation of personnel in separate
offices by race. The project had been rated "very troubled" and in need of "drastic
revision." OEO, Annual Evaluation Report of Volusia County Legal Services, 1970. Tle
lack of standards and guidelines prolonged the dispute: VCLS refused to comply with
the special condition to the 1970 grant, and local opponents contacted Senator Edward
Gurney, Mayor Richard Kane of Daytona Beach, and officials of the Florida Bar Asso-
ciation to take their cause to high officials of the Nixon Administration. See Letter
from Senator Edward J. Gurney to Donald Rumsfeld, Aug. 18, 1970; Letter from
Richard Kane (et al.) to Senator Edward Gurney, July 25, 1970; Letter from Marshall R.
Cassedy, Executive Director, Florida Bar Association to Donald Rumsfeld, Oct. 27, 1970.
OLS officials eventually succeeded in altering the composition of the board, but the
delay and disruption resulted in the demoralization and departure of many attorneys.
Interview with Bradley, supra note 15.
57. A first attempt by OLS officials to reconstitute the board of the Delta Legal Aid
Society, in Tallulah, La., failed because the "lay members of the board were hand-picked
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Maryland. 5s In each of these cases, bar domination of the governing
board produced restrictions on the project's activities: in Charlotte, a
prohibition on group representation; in Volusia County, a limitation
on law reform; in Tallulah, apparent restrictions on certain types of
suits; in Baltimore, a restriction on the number and location of neigh-
borhood offices.
In Chicago, restrictions were set by the local CAA-the Chicago
Committee on Urban Opportunity (CCUO), dominated by the mayor
-on its delegate, the Legal Aid Bureau (LAB).59 Restrictions affected
the location of LAB offices, intake procedures, representation of
groups, and suits against municipal agencies. On a number of issues
raised, such as the location of offices and intake procedures, the absence
of guidelines and standards undercut OLS' argument for change. 0
by the attorneys." Letter from Winston Webster, Director, Planning, Technical Assist-
ance and Evaluation, OLS, to George Wall, Jr., President of the Board of Directors
Delta Legal Aid, Aug. 4, 1971. The lay members, as a result, were "unassertive, non-
vocal, and wholly unrepresentative of the poverty community." And the restrictive
polities of the board remained substantially unchanged: "The board has, in its fervent
desire to protect themselves against the illusory economic threat... rendered the project
totally ineffectual. It was felt that the board has constrained the project to handle
only innocuous cases and has prevented LAS from pursuing law reform, economic de-
velopment, community representation and community education." Id. The first attempt
to reduce the bar's influence having failed, OLS threatened that funds would be cut
off after October 1, 1971, "unless the board is restructured in order to include four
persons who are representative of and democratically selected by the poverty community."
Id. The vagueness of the Guidelines allowed DLAS to a r~e, following the first attempt,
that it was in compliance, since no standard or guideline required that lay members
be "assertive' or "vocal," or defined the meaning of "representative." It is not dear,
at this writing, whether the second attempt has met with greater success.
58. In Baltimore, the City Bar Association was granted power in the by-laws of the
Legal Aid Bureau to control the number and location of neighborhood legal aid offices.
OLS officials sought to force the bar to relinquish this p owcr, since it had the effect
of restricting services to two offices, though fourteen had been planned when the
program was organized in 1965. But the bar's power had been the result of a specific
agreement between bar officials and OLS, as the "price" of bar approval of the project.
Interview with Clinton Bamberger, former Director, OLS, in Washington, D.C., Aug.
25, 1971. The lack of standards and guidelines permitted such an agreement to be made
and made it difficult to undo. The bar had control of the project's governing board,
through appointment of fourteen out of its twenty.eight members, and succeeded in
resisting demands from OLS that the project's activities be expanded to other offices.
OLS contended that the bar's power was "out of line with national policy." Memoran-
dum from Francis Duggan to Terry Lenzner, July 21. 1970. But no such national policy
had ever been defined or articulated in written form. The only concession made by
the bar was to permit the opening of two new offices. See Baltimore Sun, Oct. 6, 1970,
at 22, col. 5. See also Derby, Public Assistance in Baltimore City 26 MD. L. RM'. 328
(1966). Interview with Lawrence Hamblen, Regional Director of OLS, Middle Atlantic
Region, in Washington, D.C., Sept. 15, 1971.
59. Mayor Richard Daley is Chairman of The Chicago Committee on Urban Oppor-
tunity, the board of the CAA. The CAA was described in its 1969 Annual Report as
"an operating agency of the City of Chicago." TiE CtIc,,.o CosMssrrrac ON UflaN,
OPPoRTUNrrY, 1969 ANNUAL REPORT, VrrH THE PEorxLE (1969), reprinted in 1971 Setnate
Hearings, infra note 106, pt. 1, at 254.
60. Project attorneys objected that the location of offices in CCUO centers and the
"urban life interview" required as a part of "intake" by CAA officials both inhibited
clients and associated attorneys with the municipal agencies in the minds of many poor
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Even where CCUO restrictions seemed to violate guidelines such as the
restrictions on suits against city agencies the written policy was so
vaguely stated as to give the CCUO a colorable case. 01 The most effec-
tive weapon at OLS disposal, direct funding of the legal services project,
was virtually useless because no policy had been set on the conditions
under which direct funding would be justified. A bitter bureaucratic
struggle ensued within OEO, as well as between the local Community
Action Agency and OEO, on whether the project should remain a
delegate. The local Community Action Agency retained control until
1970. 62 In many other projects interference by the CAA has taken the
form of a demand for an administrative levy or tax on the legal services
project 63 in supposed compensation for bookkeeping, payroll and other
services rendered.04
people. The restrictions on group representation and suits against the city government
seemed to have a purely political purpose: the CCUO, controlled by Mayor Daley, re-
fused to allow any activity that threatened the dominance of the local political machine.
The division of attorneys among all the centers prevented specialization among attorneys
and an appropriate division of labor, as well as privacy for consultation with clients.
Evaluations concluded that the restrictions ought to be removed, but could point to
no specific written policy that precluded them. See Memorandum from Frank Jones to
Terry Lenzner, June 15, 1970; OEO Evaluation Teams, Annual Reports, 1966.69. See
also Chicago Bar Association, Council of Lawyers, Special Investigation, February, 1970.
61. Cf. Letter from Mrs. Murrel Syler, Director of the Chicago Committee on Urban
Opportunity, to Terry Lenzner, May 15, 1970. See also Memorandum from Frank Calucei,
then Assistant Director of OEO for Operations, to Wesley Hjornevik, Deputy Director
of OEO, Feb. 18, 1970. Many officials within OEO, particularly those associated with
the Community Action program, felt that the restrictions were not improper, or at least
not explicitly contrary to OEO policy. This was argued, for example, by Frank Carlucel,
who had responsibility for the Community Action program as Assistant Director of OEO
for Operations.
62. Officials within the OEO associated with the Community Action Program insisted
that there should be direct funding only in three cases: (1) where there was no CAA
covering the appropriate geographical area, (2) where the CAA declined to be the
grantee, or (3) where the CAA was "so ineffective" and "incapable" that the CAA
itself should be suspended or terminated. Memorandum from Frank Carlucci to Donald
Rumsfeld, Feb. 27, 1970. In the case of Chicago, they contended, none of these condi-
tions was present. OLS officials countered that the general competence of the CAA
should not be the major criterion, but rather the nature of the relationship of the CAA
to the project, though they agreed that the "burden of proof of the desirability and/or
necessity for direct funding" should fall on the party seeking it. Memorandum from
Terry Lenzner to Wesley Hjornevik, July 17, 1970. The CCUO enlisted Mayor Daley,
the Cook County Bar Association, Representative Roman Pucinski and other local
Congressmen to exert pressure on OEO against direct funding. OLS prevailed, and on
June 8, 1970, Donald Rumsfeld decided to fund the LAB directly. See Telegram from
Frank Jones to Mayor Daley, June 8, 1970. But the dispute severely disrupted LAB
activities, and the internal divisions scarred relationships within OEO' and lowered
morale in the project. Interview with William H. McClaskey, Regional Director of OLS,
Great Lakes Region, OLS, by telephone, Aug. 17, 1971. The general issue of direct
funding was never settled.
63. Many CAA's charge fees for supportive activities, but OLS officials have never
determined what percentage of the project budget would be fair payment. As a result,
the levies have varied greatly in amount, from a token amount in some cases to fifteen
per cent of the project's budget in others. Interview with Duggan, supra note 20.
64. The kinds of problems encountered by numerous CAA's as a result of the lack
of policysetting on such levies is illustrated by the tumultuous dispute in Grand Rapids,
Michigan, where OEO officials declined direct funding until the CAA withheld all
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2. Eligibility
In Dallas, the Dallas Legal Services Project (DLSP) provoked the
ire of local officials and Congressmen by representing clients who were
deemed "anti-establishment." The opponents charged that the project
was representing non-poor and ineligible clients, citing particularly
the representation of an editor/publisher of an underground news-
paper. They argued that the client should have been ruled ineligible
because he was "voluntarily poor"; he was a college graduate and the
son of a wealthy manufacturer. He had been disinherited by his father,
however, and was earning less than $100 a month.0 5 OLS officials them-
selves were in a quandary as to the publisher's eligibility: representa-
tion of such a client, as Deputy Director Frank Jones wrote, was "an
accurate reflection of existing practice" but not "existing policy" be-
cause there was "no formal policy statement" on the voluntarily poor,
and the "existing guideline is indeed vague."00 The reaction of OLS
officials was inconsistent and unsupportive: they first demanded that
the case be dropped, then encouraged it to go forward. 7 Nevertheless,
money from the project for nine months, creating an emergency situation and nearly
destroying the project. The Grand Rapids CAA demanded a levy of five per cent of
the project budget, but evaluations reported that the services it performed were minimal,
and that the "most pressing, serious project weakness" was the "conflict with the Com-
munity Action program." Auerbach Associates, Inc.. Evaluation Report Legal Aid Society
of Grand Rapids, Michigan, OCL 23, 1970. OLS officials had no answer to the arguments
of CAA officials that such charges were justified for "central administrative expenses"
(Letter from Raymond Tardy, Director, Community Action Program, to Stewart Christian,
Director of Legal Aid Society of Grand Rapids, June 12, 1970), though evaluations
recommended that the levy be disallowed and that legal services offices be separated
from the CAA centers in order to "preserve as far as possible the normal attorney.client
relationship." Auerbach Associates supra. The withholding of funds by the CAA was
an attempt to compel the project to continue the administrative relationship. Numerous
meetings were held at all levels of the program, one of them incuding Wesley Hjornevik
and Terry Lenzner on September 14, 1970. The history of these meetings and summaries
of the major documents involved demonstrate that much of the nine month delay in
decision-making was due to internal uncertainty as td the justification for such adminis-
trative levies in general and in this project in particular. See Memorandum from William
McClaskey to Arthur Reid, Acting Director of OLS. re Resume of Problems of Grand
Rapids LSP with CAA, Feb. 18, 1971. See also Warren Fox and Charles W. Quick,
Evaluation Report, Feb. 23, 1970.
65. The publisher of Dallas Notes was sued under the state obscenity law for the
June 3-16 issue, which carried on its front page a photograph of a nude man, front
view. He was at the head of a march sponsored by a local radio station to support
mini-skirts and protest longer hemlines. Dallas Notes, June 3-16. at 1. Legal Services
attorneys appeared on behalf of the publisher, Brett Stein, in an attempt to remove
the case to a federal court, but were unsuccessful. Representative James Collins and
Senator John Tower both protested the representation. See Letters from James W. Griffith,
Regional Director of OLS, Southwest Region, to Congressman James Collins. July 2.
1970, and Senator John Tower, July 20, 1970. See also OEO Evaluation of Dallas Legal
Services Project, Aug. 7, 1970.
66. Letter from Frank Jones to Fred Condor, Chief of Southwest Region, OLS, Nov.
5, 1970.
67. OLS officials initially demanded that the case be dropped but the DLSP director,
Ed Polk, argued that the publisher should not be denied services because he had chosen
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the opponents' attacks had an important psychological effect on the
project, demoralizing the staff and arousing fears of funding reductions
in response to congressional pressure. Moreover, the incident and the
indecisive response of OLS encouraged other critics.08
Much the same pattern was evident in the controversy involving the
Western Center on Law and Poverty (Western Center) in Los Angeles,
which was attacked by local and state officials for its suit against the
California Youth Authority on behalf of thirteen employees who had
been suspended or demoted. The national office agreed with critics of
the program that the clients' "incomes place them in the middle or
upper income brackets."60 But the Western Center argued that its
eligibility criteria were consistent with OEO Guidelines, even though
the criteria specified no income level and allowed representation in
any case which had been declined by three private attorneys.70 Though
a low-paying profession. He contended that the Southwest Regional Office of OEO had
assured him that the publisher was eligible. Letter from Ed Polk, Director of DLSP, to
Terry Lenzner, Oct. 29, 1970.
68. Interview with Duggan, supra note 20.
69. Telegram from Terry Lenzner to Martin Levine, Chairman Board of Directors,
Western Center on Law and Poverty, Oct. 22, 1970. The telegram demanded that
within twenty days the cases be referred to private counsel or, if that were not possible,
that the legal services attorneys withdraw from the cases with permission of the court
on the ground that the attorneys were not authorized to provide representation to
these clients. "It is our view," Lenzner said, "that the center may not represent other
than low income persons. There can be no question that this conclusion is required by
the Economic Opportunity Act and by Legal Services guidelines." He added: "Tile
provision of free legal services to those whose incomes place them in the middle or
upper income brackets is clearly in violation of the purposes and goals of the Economic
Opportunity Act." The suit was filed on February 26, 1970, for damages, injunctive
relief and declaratory relief on behalf of clients who claimed they had been disciplined
as a result of their efforts to organize and maintain the Coalition for Correctional
Reform, aimed at uniting individuals involved in the correctional process to bring
about change. Alderete v. Terhune, Civil No. 70-131-TH (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 20, 1970).
Attorneys of the Western Center attempted to refer the case to numerous attorneys-
through the Los Angeles Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, and other
groups. The employees had been disciplined for complaining of conditions alleged to
exist in the wards. See Memorandum from Ralph Segura, attorney at the Western Center
on Law and Poverty, to Terry Hatter, Director of the Center on Law and Poverty, r
Alderete v. Terhune, Oct. 7, 1970.
70. Telegram from Martin Levine to Terry Lenzner, Oct. 26, 1970. A standard based
solely on income, Levine argued, "is not contained in the Economic Opportunity Act
and is contrary to the OEO legal services guidelines, contrary to the standards of the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association, and contrary to the eligibility criteria
which you have approved for our program in 1969 and 1970." Paragraph 4 of the
eligibility criteria adopted by the Western Center Board of Directors, and approved
in 1969 and 1970 by OEO as part of the refunding application, provided: "Where
three attorneys have indicated they will not take the case, the case may be accepted by
the Center with the approval of the Director." Contrary to Lenzner's contention, Levine
said that the Director had approved this case, after "over a dozen attorneys were con-
tacted." In the telegram, Levine argued that "standards which allow determinations of
financial eligibility solely on the basis of specific income levels or the possession of
specific assets, i.e., automobile, home, etc., should be eliminated." Otherwise, there
would be "a major, important contraction in the availability of legal services to the
poor." See also Auerbach Associates, Inc., Evaluation Report, Western Center on Law
and Poverty, June 23, 1971. The evaluation gave the Center an overall rating of "good,"
and particularly praised its law reform work: "The Center has made its greatest impact
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the suit was allowed to proceed, the vagueness of the Guidelines re-
duced OLS officials to impotence as the controversy raged, and also
undermined the project's attempts to justify its policies. 71
3. Services
In New Orleans, officials led by Rep. Joe Waggoner, Jr., had a rec-
ord of hostility to the New Orleans Legal Assistance Corporation
(NOLAC), primarily resulting from its aggressive representation of
the poor in suits against local interests. They charged that NOLAC
attorneys were defending twelve members of the black militant Na-
tional Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF), who had been arrested
after a two-day shoot out with New Orleans police. 2 The project con-
tended that its activities in the case consisted only of representation in
the bail reduction hearing and a request for a preliminary hearing.73
Both the project and OLS officials were handicapped in countering
criticism by the fact that the Guidelines did not specify whether such
activities were permissible. 74 But even more damaging to their position
in Southern California through its law reform activities and has earned a reputation
for high quality legal work." For a general description of Western Center activities, we
Western Center on Law and Poverty, A Report to the U.S. Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity In Support of Refunding the Western Center on Law and Poverty 1971-1972,
February 18, 1971.
71. A comparable situation occurred in St. Louis, where Governor William Hearnes
of Missouri vetoed a $390,359 grant for the Legal Aid Society of St. Louis, charging that
the project had represented rent strikers in public housing, a black militant who was
involved in church confrontation and black students accused of mutilating an American
flag. All of them, he contended, were ineligible. OLS officials urged OEO Director
Donald Rumsfeld to override the veto, but their arguments lost considerable credence
when they were asked to justify the project's activities in terns of guidelines and
standards. An investigation produced evidence that a number of the clients were, in
fact, "dearly ineligible." Memorandum from William Barvick, Regional Director of OLS,
North Central Region, to Terry Lenzner, Dec. 24. 1969. Questions were raised as to the
content, as well as enforcement of the St. Louis standard. The failure to clarify and
enforce the Guidelines, supra note 20, made it much more difficult for Rumsfeld to
resist criticism of the project from local officials. See Letters from Senator Thomas F.
Eagleton to John Danforth, Attorney General, State of Missouri, Dec. 20, 1969, and
from Terry Lenzner to Senator Thomas F. Eagleton, Dec. 19, 1969. Though he eventually
decided to override the veto, his delay in doing so undermined morale in the project.
More important, as a concession to the critics, eight special conditions vere attached
to the grant. Telegram from Terry Lenzner to Don Thomason, Regional Director of
OEO, Great Lakes Region, Jan. 6, 1970.
72. Letter from Representative Joe D. Waggoner, Jr., to Donald Ruumisfeld, Oct. 5,
1970. Waggoner demanded to know whether Rumsfeld "condoned" the project's service
to NCCF, which he said was an organization modeled after the Black Panthers.
73. Letter from John Nelson, Chairman of the Board, New Orleans Legal Assistance
Corporation to Terry Lenzner, Nov. 6. 1970.
74. Community Action Program Memorandum No. 79 § B(2)(), Jan. 15, 1953, implied
that such representation was legitimate, since it preceded the in ictment or information
stage. Yet the Memorandum was not entirely clear on this point. The issue was com-
plicated by the fact that Barry Portman, Acting Director of NOLC. had specifically
requested permission to represent the NCCF clients in a call to Fred Condor, Acting
Director of OLS, Southwest Region, on September 18, 1970. Condor had expressed no
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was the disclosure that they had failed to enforce the Guidelines in
several previous cases involving clear violations. The ambiguity of the
standards, combined with the failure of enforcement, forced the OLS
to make serious concessions (including the suspension of two attor-
neys) .75 The local project, and indeed the program as a whole, was
severely shaken by these concessions. As a direct consequence of the
attack,76 the two top officials of OLS were fired, a tremendous blow to
the entire program.
77
objection to NOLAC's involvement in the criminal cases. The NOLAC officials argued
that such representation would be within the Memorandum because of the practical
unavailability of adequate defense counsel in the Orleans Parish Criminal Court, because
of provisions in the NOLAC 1970 work plan providing for such criminal representation
(which had been approved by legal services officials) and finally because of tacit ap-
proval of previous criminal representation reported in NOLAC quarterly reports.
75. Initially, OLS threatened suspension or termination of the project if NOLAC
had violated the criminal representation Guideline. A full investigation showed that
OLS had to take a share of responsibility for the violation-if indeed it actually occurred
-for its failure to clarify or enforce the Guideline previously. Nevertheless, in order to
mollify opponents, OLS imposed a number of special conditions on the project. Letter
from Terry Lenzner to John Nelson, Nov. 11, 1970. The restrictions, even if intended
as only symbolic, might have had a significant chilling effect. Moreover, the dismissal
of the two attorneys was publicized throughout the community and the legal services
program.
76. Opponents were not appeased by the OLS concessions; nor was Director Rumsfeld
pleased with the handling of the affair by OLS. The firing of Terry Lenzner on
November 20, 1970, was a direct result of his refusal to impose more stringent restrc.
tions on NOLAC. Interview with Lenzner, supra note 15.
The failure to enforce a clear policy on criminal representation, as well as in other
areas, may sometimes give the appearance of official sanction to very questionable
practices. In the case of Upper Peninsula Legal Services (UPLS) in Michigan, for example,
evaluations reported that criminal litigation constituted some twenty to twenty-five per
cent of the caseload in both 1969 and 1970. John D. Kettelle Corporation, Evaluation of
Upper Peninsula Legal Services Inc., March 4, 1971. "As UPLS has become more con-
fident of OLS's tacit allowance of its misdemeanor involvement," one evaluation reported,
"it is increasing." Id. The reason for such "tacit allowance" by the legal services re-
gional officials, who were aware of the criminal representation, had been the shortage
of lawyers in this vast and sparsely populated area. See Memorandum from Douglas
Martin, staff, Office of Legal Services to Terry Lenzner, June 4, 1970. Regional offilals
argued that the courts appointed and paid the attorneys in felony cases. Representation
in misdemeanor cases did not violate the statute, they argued, because persons accused
of a misdemeanor in Michigan are proceeded against by a simple written complaint
signed by a police officer, without indictment or information. Id. Project officials
argued that "a person accused of a misdemeanor would in many cases lose his job
because he cannot drive to work." Id. The evaluation urged that "OEO should make
some rational and explicit decision on the increasing amount of criminal representation
which UPLS is doing." Kettelle Evaluation, supra.
77. A controversy as to the propriety of services also erupted in Camden, N.J., where
attorneys for Camden Regional Legal Services (CRLS) filed suit in federal court against
two major urban renewal projects in August, 1970 alleging that city plans would result
in destruction of a substantial amount of low income housing without sufficient reloca-
tion, in violation of federal law. Camden Coalition v. Nardi, Civil No. 1128-70 (D.N.J.,
filed Aug. 19, 1970). See Housing Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c)(1) and (2) (1970). The
plaintiffs included eleven civil rights and community groups and ten persons repre.
sentative of the class of poor people adversely affected by urban renewal. The defendants
included Camden's mayor and city council, the Camden housing authority, HUD, the
U.S. Department of Labor, and others. In the fall of 1971 work on the projects was
halted as the suit made it impossible for the housing authority to convey clear title to
the developer. David H. Dugan, III, Director, Camden Regional Legal Services, Inc., A
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The charges of the state bar association against North Mississippi
Rural Legal Services (NMRLS) centered in large part on the issue of
services: whether NMRLS should be permitted to concentrate its re-
sources on law reform suits. The absence of guidelines setting forth
priorities between law reform and other forms of service such as indi-
vidual casework made it more difficult for the local and OLS officials
to justify the project's record in terms of OEO policy.78 The state bar
Detailed Account and Analysis of Vice-President Agnew's Recent Involvement with
Camden Regional Legal Services, Feb. 10, 1972.
The mayor of Camden and Representative John Hunt complained that CRLS should
not be allowed to block the city's urban renewal and road construction program. See
Letter from Rep. John Hunt to Donald Rumisfeld, Feb. 5, 1970; Letter from Joseph M.
Nardi, Jr., Mayor, City of Camden, to Donald Rumnsfeld, OCt. 23, 1970; Letter from
Joseph Nardi, Jr. to David Dugan, III, Oct. 23, 1970; Letter from Joseph Nardi, Jr. to
Frank Carlucci, Director, Office of Economic Opportunity, May 6, 1971. In his letter to
Rumsfeld, Nardi charged that the suits against the city represented a "complete disregard
of the responsibility given to representatives of Legal Services. . . . I wish to regter
my opposition to any continued funding of this program and I am notifying each of
the congressional delegation which represents this district of this concern . . . ." He
charged that the Assistant Director of the Camden project, Peter J. O'Connor, was making
"an intensive effort to disrupt the community and to completely disregard development
in the city of Camden." Letter from Joseph M. Nardi, Jr. to Peter O'Connor, Assistant
Director Camden Regional Legal Services Inc., Oct. 23, 1970. The president of the
Camden City Council wrote to Vice-President Agnew in December, claiming that CRLS
-was "attempting to destroy the government and the establishment." Letter from Elijah
Perry to Vice President Agnew quoted in Dugan, supra. When Agnew traveled to a
speaking engagement in New Jersey in January 1972, Camden public officials met with
him to solicit support. Fred Speaker, Director of OLS, then made his own investigation
in Camden. In a thirty-four-page report to the Vice-President, Speaker concluded that
CRLS was operating within federal guidelines and urged no further outside involvement
in the matter. Interview with David Dugan, in New Haven, Conn., Feb. 22, 1972.
Nevertheless, Agnew decided to meet with all parties to the controversy. On February
1, 1972, he met with David Dugan, OEO Director Philip Sanchez, Camden Mayor
Joseph Nardi, three other city officials, Representative Hunt, representatives of Camden's
major industries, and others. Dugan, Account and Analysis, sup.ra. Agnew began by de.
claring that he had no intention of interfering with the pending litigation in any way,
but he later became very critical of the legal services attoreys, stating
Mayor Nardi has a greater right to claim that he represents your ients than you
do because he earned that right at the polls. We don't even know at this stage . . .
how the client came into the client-counselor relationship.... I'm not making any
accusations. I'm merely expressing a great fear that government is going to become
impossible if every time an elected official attempts to carry out what needs to be
carried out that he's faced with court proceedings... I think if you sit and forget
the technicalities of your legal position for a minute and listen to these councilmen
and listen to these gentlemen who represent the business community ... you might
be less militant in adhering to . . . the total extent of your lep.l right in every
instance, and more conciliatory toward reaching a result that will allow the City
of Camden to resuscitate itself, as it lies gasping.
Transcript of Meeting in Vice-President Agnew's Office, Feb. 1, 1972. The Vice-Prsident's
meeting, and his subsequent remarks on NBC's "Today" show, provoked a national
controversy. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1972, at I, col 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1972, & 4,
at 3, col. 3; Press Release, Transcript NBC Today Show Interview with the Vice President
of the United States (Feb. 8, 1972).
78. The project had been rated one of the best in the nation, receiving an overall
grade of 11.3 on a scale of 12 in its most recent evaluation. "The evaluation team was
impressed by this project's law reform activity, its excellent attoreys, and its image
in the poverty community. These would have been viewed favorably in any environment;
but the fact that the project was operating successfully in Mississippi was felt to be
remarkable." Auerbach Associates, Inc., Evaluation Report: North Mississippi Rural
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conducted an investigation that employed methods of a very question-
able nature79 But legal services officials had often used similar meth-
ods in their own evaluation reports. In the absence of investigative
standards, they had no basis for justifying their own techniques, much
less for impugning the bar association's investigation. 0 Representatives
of the bar carried their attack to the Director of OEO and the White
House staff, demanding that the project be gutted and replaced by a
bar-operated judicare project. Both the Director and the White House
staff placed substantial credence in the charges of the bar because OLS
officials were unable to defend the project's activities in terms of
guidelines and standards.81 OLS succeeded in resisting the bar's chal-
lenge and vindicating the project only after a lengthy investigation
which imposed substantial costs in money, energy and staff morale.82-
Legal Services, Aug. 16, 1971. Nonetheless, law reform was not among the five objectives
mentioned in the Guidelines, supra note 20, at 1. Under the "scope of lcal services
rendered," the Guidelines noted that "advocacy of appropriate reforms in statutes,
regulations and administrative practices is a part of the traditional role of the lawyer
and should be among the services afforded by the program." Guidelines supra note 20,
at 7. But OLS never emphasized this point either in the enumeration of objectives or In
a separate document. Nor was there any attempt to determine roughly what proportion
of the project's resources should be devoted to law reform.
79. The state bar association commissioned the Pendleton Detective Agency to perform
an investigation. The detectives sought out clients without prior consent from their
attorneys, in violation of the Canons of Ethics. A separate investigation by OEO reported
that the bar's charges were "based on hearsay information and rumors that were not
adequately checked by the complainant before submission." OEO, Composite Report
on Investigation of Charges Made By Bar Association of the State of Mississippi Against
the North Mississippi Rural Legal Services Program, 1970.
80. Evaluation teams often interviewed clients without first contacting the lawyers
representing them, and asked detailed questions about their impressions of the quality
of representation they received.
81. A fact of some importance was the persistent support given the Mississippi state
bar by Clark Reed, Chairman of the Mississippi Republican party. However, even
members on the White House staff inclined to disregard this fact expressed strong
skepticism and suspicion of the manner in which OLS officials defended the project's
activities. They complained that OLS seemed to be asking them to "take on faith"
assertions that the project was operating in accord with "national policy." More linpor.
tant, they felt less justified in giving Reed an unequivocally negative response-a clear
"brush-off"--in the absence of well-defined and enforced guidelines. Personal minem-
orandum of the author, Richard Blumenthal.
82. The inadequacy of the Guidelines was illustrated by attempts of OLS officials
to assess the propriety of a campaign against police brutality conducted in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, by the Director of the Legal Aid Society (LAS), William Fitzpatrick.
Following the shooting of a young Mexican-American, Fitzpatrick joined in picketing
(carrying a sign reading "Support your local Gestapo"), endorsed a critical leaflet and
testified before the Albuquerque Metropolitan Crime Commission. He defeated out-
raged attempts to oust him, mobilizing the client community at one meeting to vote
out a number of LAS governing board members and thus reverse the board's previous
decision to fire him. See Dewey, What Happened in Albuquerque, 51 LEGAL AID BRIECArSE
227 (1970). Nonetheless, the dispute over the Director's actions became severely debilitatingf
to the project, as an evaluation reported, because of "armed war on almost every issue
between LAS and the local bar association, and the "attitude of overkill" on Fitzpatrick's
part. "Political problems" were consuming "entirely too much staff time." Thomas Fike,
Evaluation Report, Jan. 14, 1970. See also Auerbach Associates Inc., Evaluation of Al.
buquerque Legal Aid Society, Jan. 13, 1971. Moreover, the United Fund decided to
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F. Vulnerability to Political Interference
Many OLS officials, though aware of the potential advantages of
policysetting and responsiveness, were too busy with more immediate
matters or too low on the bureaucratic ladder to take responsibility for
this task. A number of OLS officials, notably the two most recent di-
rectors, Terry Lenzner and Fred Speaker, tried to deal with these prob-
lems. They encountered resistance from other OEO officials, however,
and from their own bureaucracy. They were further handicapped by
the need to counter more basic attacks to the very existence of the
program from within the Administration. 3 Other OLS officials, par-
ticularly in the first years of the program, believed that there were
countervailing advantages to the existing practices. Formulating,
promulgating, disseminating and revising guidelines would have con-
sumed substantial time and energy, both of which were in especially
short supply during the early days of the program. Officials wanted
their style to be action-oriented, a break with the usual paper-clogged
bureaucratic modes. They were progeny of the New Frontier. They
saw their mission as starting a large number of projects as quickly as
possible, spinning out solutions to problems pragmatically, ad hoc, and
free of voluminous written policies.84 Throughout recent years, as well
as earlier, the absence of written policy increased OLS power over
local programs, allowing OLS officials maximum discretion in dictat-
ing terms of grants and qualifications of personnel.8 Most important,
however, it gave legal services a low profile. It made the program a
smaller, more elusive target to attack, and permitted officials to make
cease its annual contribution which had amounted to $24,000 in the previous year, and
which constituted a significant part of the project's local share. Letter from W.D. James,
President of the United Community Fund, to Board of Directors of the Legal Aid
Society of Albuquerque, Dec. 10, 1969. See note 95 infra. OLS officials were forced to re-
main on the sidelines. They could not reprimand or discipline the project, because the
Director's activities could be interpreted as "educational" under CAP Memorandum No.
66, and certainly did not involve the use of the mass media. But they could not defend it
either, because the Director was not acting on behalf of any specific client and vas dearly
engaged in attempting to influence public opinion on a mass scale. See note 40 supra.
Fitzpatrick's activities seemed to violate Instruction No. 6907-3, prohibiting participation
in "direct action" such as picketing and parades. See note 40 supra. But Fitzpatrick
contended that he was participating in the demonstration on his own time. Dewey, supra.
83. For a partial account of efforts by Lenzner and Speaker to deal with this problem,
see notes 37, 40 & 62 supra.
84. Interview with Bamberger, supra note 15. For a description of the attitudes of
many of the founders of the antipoverty program, and the pressures under which they
operated, see Blumenthal, supra note 15.
85. One Regional Director, for example, told governing boards that they must dear
the hiring of any new project director with the Regional Office. Authorization for this
requirement could not be found anywhere in the Guidelines, but the projects accepted
it on faith. Interview with Barbara Fisher, Regional Director of OLS, Northwest Region,
in Washington, D.C., Sept. 15, 1971.
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pragmatic concessions in particular instances, while refusing to make
similar concessions on other projects or issues. Finally, OLS officials
recognized that an absence of written policy would relieve them of the
burden of facing critical arguments on the merits of issues in public
forums, such as Congress, where a focus on guidelines might trigger
inquiry or debate.
Whatever the advantages of this approach, the failure of policy-
setting and responsiveness raised the program's vulnerability to political
interference by giving opponents an edge in appeals to the media or
Congress, 80 by fostering disputes between local projects and OLS8T
and by undercutting the resources and security of program officials.88
The time and energy that might have been invested in writing guide-
lines were expended instead in defending against political attack. The
total pragmatism of the program and the unchecked discretion of OLS
left many projects on the open seas, without cover or camouflage in
times of interference. With adequate policysetting and responsiveness
OLS officials might have defused many suspicions played upon by
opponents-particularly suspicions about their ad hoc mode of deci-
sionmaking. They might have forced debate to focus on the merits of
policies for the nation as a whole, not on the unique defects of par-
ticular projects, which opponents were able to use to smear the entire
program. Moreover, OLS and local projects might have been far more
united in facing such critics, rather than bickering with one another
as they did in the Dallas and Western Center episodes. 89 In justifying
project policies, a local official might have pointed to guidelines au-
thorizing the challenged activity and to other projects engaging in the
same activity. Perhaps most important, officials might have argued that
Congress itself had tacitly approved the guidelines by declining to pass
contrary legislation. Indeed, the mere existence of guidelines, apart
from their merits, might have made Congress more willing to respect
the independence of the program, on the theory that it was operating
responsibly. The fear of congressional interference might have been
thereby diminished.90 Adequate policysetting and a conception of how
86. See description of Western Center controversy, pp. 252-53 supra.
87. See description of New Orleans controversy, pp. 253-54 supra.
88. It is difficult to document this phenomenon, but the psychological effects of
political interference are clearly maximized by the feeling among officials that their
actions cannot be legitimated by appeal to written policies.
89. See pp. 251-52 supra.
90. The new legislation indicates that Congress may be willing to grant increasing
measures of independence only if assured that policies will be formulated and dissemi-
nated in guidelines and standards. See p. 263 infra.
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power should have been allocated would have reduced the impact of
interference: the concessions which many projects were forced to make,
directly or indirectly, in modifying their activities; the demoralization
of staff and departure of many dispirited attorneys; the tremendous
drain on time, energy and financial resources; and the disillusionment
of many client community members. A former OLS official described
the problem. The program's policy is "assumed," he wrote, "like the
air we breathe." And he commented on the costs:
The absence of written guidance gives the program an inde-
fensibly subjective posture in the eyes of our enemies, and the
failure to address ourselves to some of the really hard questions
that present themselves except on a crisis basis nurtures an at-
mosphere of mistrust and suspicion among our supporters who
are ever ready to see signs of a sellout.91
II. The Proposed National Corporation Legislation: Policysetting
and Responsiveness
A. The Proposed Legislation and Political Interference
The proposed legislation includes several provisions designed to
reduce the vulnerability of the program to outside pressure on both
national and local levels. The independence of the Corporation
would be sought through the creation of an autonomous national
board of directors whose members are protected from executive
influence by the method of appointment and the fixed three-year
term of service.92 In addition, the legislation would eliminate the
provisions in the OEO Act for the governor's veto,03 a weapon
used prominently against legal services projects in the past, 4 and
any formal relationships with state governments. Finally, the local
share funding requirement would be deleted.0
91. Memorandum, William M. Barvick, Regional Director of Legal Services, North
Central Region, to Terry Lenzner. re The Need for More Written Guidance for Legal
Services Programs, Jan. 20, 1970. "It is a pretty naked feeling for a staff, a director or
a board to be boxed in this kind of position and to, in effect, be put in the posture of
having made a broad policy decision based on subjective views without any written
guidance for support." Id.
92. The Bill § 1004 (a), (b). See notes 1 & 2 supra.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2834 (1970). See note 18 supra.
94. See pp. 234-36 supra.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2812(c) (1970). See note 19 supra. The director could wiaive the
requirement that the grantee furnish twenty per cent of the costs of the program. but.
in practice, the requirement wvas selectively ignored with respect to many programs which
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These provisions may protect the program against some of the
more egregious attempts at political interference. The independence
of the national board, for example, would discourage the kind of
direct appeal to the White House or federal bureaucracy that fueled
local controversy in Mississippi.0 0 The board would be unfettered
in its choice of an executive director, possibly the most important
decision to be made, and he in turn would be free of any political
restrictions in considering the merits of potential employees.0 7 The
governor's veto, though exercised infrequently, often constituted an
important threat against local projects.08 The twenty per cent "local
share" requirement, though often not strictly enforced by the OLS
or religiously followed by projects," nonetheless forced many projects
to temper their policies to meet objections from local contributors. 100
Under the new legislation, however, the Corporation's independ-
ence would not be absolute by any means. A majority of national board
members would owe their appointments to the President, and they
might be as susceptible as commissioners of independent regulatory
agencies to consultation behind the scenes. 10 1 No limits would be set
on the number of board members to be appointed from any political
party, or on the number of names the President may reject on the
lists submitted to him by the Clients and Project Attorneys Advisory
Councils.
02
failed to meet the requirement, especially where the local bar association and com.
munity were considered hostile. Many grantees met the requirement almost entirely
through in-kind contributions-volunteer time contributed by local attorneys, or office
space provided by the city or county-the value of which could be substantially ad.
justed upward. The local share was never closely scrutinized for itemization of such
values, and the practice of "fudging" flourished. The need for meeting the local share,
however, has long been regarded as a significant constraint on local programs because
it has forced some of them to come under pressure to temper their policies in return
for contributions. In Albuquerque, for example, threats of withdrawal of support from
the police force caused the major source of local funds to cease its contributions. Inter-
views with Speaker and Johnson, supra note 15.
96. See pp. 255-56 supra.
97. The Bill § 1004(d).
98. The most notable vetoes occurred with respect to projects in St. Louis and
Kansas City, Missouri (Governor William Hearnes), California Rural Legal Assistance
(Governor Ronald Reagan), Maricopa, Arizona (Governor Jack Williams) and Alexandria,
Louisiana (Governor John McKeithen). All such vetoes have been overriden by the
Director of OEO (with the exception of the Alexandria veto) pursuant to his authority
under 42 U.S.C. § 2834 (1970). See note 18 supra. In addition, governors of South Dakota
until 1971 informally communicated to OEO their intention to veto a grant If any was
made in that state; as a result, no project was funded there during the program's first
five years. Interview with Duggan, supra note 20.
99. Interviews with Lenzner, Speaker, Johnson, supra note 15.
100. See note 83 supra.
101. See, e.g., E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. ScnuLz, "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMsISSION 134-40 (1969); R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OilSSION:
THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE FCC 1-9 (1970).
102. The Bill § 1004. See also note 108 infra.
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As an independent corporation the program might be less likely to
receive the presidential support it formerly enjoyed. 0 3 In addition,
the Corporation would still be required to obtain yearly appropria-
tions from Congress;1 04 the legal services program in the past has faced
a number of severe battles at this stage. 105 Officials of the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting, the model for the National Legal Services Cor-
poration, 00 have found this process to create "a strong perception of
103. The fervent and unswerving support which President Johnson gave to the anti-
poverty program as a whole was often crucial to legal services, particularly in budget
fights, when spending totals for the entire OEO were at stake. See LnvrrA.,. supra note
104. Under President Nixon the OEO was reshaped: the experimental and innovative
aspects of its mission were emphasized, new personnel were appointed to key positions,
and certain programs, such as Head Start and the Job Corps, were delegated and then
transferred to other federal agencies. With these changes, President Nixon adopted the
program as his own. Its budget was his budget, its officials were his appointees. Though
his enthusiasm for OEO did not match President Johnson's, he could not simply walk
away from it and be free of responsibility. Yet a President might easily abandon the
new Corporation. He would be in no way responsible for its budget, its Chairman, its
activities or executive staff. Supporters of the Corporation cannot argue for its inde-
pendence and, at the same time, contend that the President must defend it as his own.
104. The Bill § 1009.
105. The most widely publicized battle was over the so.called Murphy Amendment.
In December 1969, the House-Senate Conference Committee deleted an amendment added
by the Senate (offered by Murphy) to the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 19G9,
Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-177, 83 Stat. 829. The amendment would have
given state governors the power to veto funding grants for legal services projects in
whole or in part and would have eliminated the existing power of the Director of OEO
to override the veto. 115 CONG. REC. 29894 (1969). The board of governors of the American
Bar Association described the amendment as "'oppressive interference with the freedom
of the lawyer and the citizen' which would 'discourage actions that are politically un-
popular.'" N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1969, at 46, col. 1. The Washington Post said that the
amendment threatened "to kill one of the most creative and socially useful projects
financed by the Office of Economic Opportunity." Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1969, at
A22, col. 1. See generally S. LEvrrAN, THE GREAT SOcIETY's POOR LA1w (1969).
106. A major ABA study recommended the corporation option as the best means of
assuring "permanence" and "program stability," as well as "independence." It suggested
that the "policy-making board" have a majority of lawyers, with significant representa-
tion of the judiciary and the organized bar. The corporation, modeled after the Cor-
poration for Public Broadcasting, would have received for a permanent authorization
a minimum of $90 million. The study was completed by the Section of Individual
Rights and Responsibilities and the Standing Committee On Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants in February 1971, under the staff direction of Charles Edson, former Director
of the Office of Operations, OLS. See ABA, SEcTiON OF INDIVIDUAL Rici'r AND RPsro,,-
SIBILTrrE5 AND THE STANDING CONmiTTEE ON LEGAL AmD AND INDIGENT DEFa.NDXoArs, JoNT
INFORPMATIONAL REPORT: TiE CORPORATIoN FOR LEGAL SERvicas 42-59 (1971). In a rcmo
lution adopted on April 29, 1971, in Williamsburg, Virginia, the ABA's board of gov-
ernors approved in principle the -concept of a corporation for Legal Services "the charter
of which shall contain assurances that the independence of lawyers involved in the
Legal Services program to represent clients in a manner consistent with the professional
mandates shall be maintained." ABA Resolution of April 29, 1971, reprinted an Hearings
on the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1971 Before the Subcommittee on Em-
ployment, Manpower and Poverty of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
92d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 4, at 1464 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings].
The National Advisory Committee of the legal services program submitted a set of
recommendations to the White House on March 24, 1971, endorsing the corporation
concept. "The federal government must continue to shoulder the responsibility for the
support and maintenance of the Legal Services Program." Its goals included "efforts
to improve institutions of justice to make them more effective and efficient." The cor-
poration recommended ivould have had a board of twenty-three members, with client
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pressure,"107 whatever the justification for it in terms of the rights of
the constituency Congress represents.
Perhaps most important, past challenges to the program's independ-
ence have rarely resulted from direct presidential intervention of the
representatives. National Advisory Committee on the Legal Services Program, Recom.
mendations on Proposed Transfer, March 24, 1971.
The Citizens Advocate Center sponsored two influential studies, supporting the cor-
poration proposal on the condition that the legislation require the 'promulgation of
procedures, the articulation of criteria, the delineation of the decision.making process
and the creation of effective mechanisms to hold the private corporation to its own
procedures and standards." Citizens Advocate Center, Legal Services: Where Next? A
Discussion of Legislative Alternatives 16 (undated); Citizens Advocate Center, Legal
Services: An Agenda of Current Issues (undated). The corporation, they contended,
"might have relatively little leverage to affect the restructuring of the legal system" and
the proposal failed to deal with "the question of discipline of members of the profession."
Citizens Advocate Center, Legal Services: Where Next?, supra, at 16. The studies drew
heavily on a report submitted by Edgar and Jean Cahn to the President's Advisory
Council on Executive Organization. Cahn & Cahn, Legal Services: Alternative Organiza.
tional Models, June 9, 1970. This report seriously considered transfer of the progran
to the judiciary, but rejected the idea because of the courts' historic "difficulty in
securing funds," and "the possible jeopardy to the special but extremely precarious
status which that branch now holds in the public mind." Id. at 27. Though the Cals
themselves believed that these obstacles could be overcome, their consultations with
various members of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, persuaded them that
transfer to the judiciary would be strongly opposed. Interview with Edgar Cahn, former
Special Assistant to OEO Director Sargent Shriver, in Washington, D.C., Ang. 18, 1971.
Various arguments were considered by these studies in favor of alternative orgaul
zational models. The Justice Department location was seen as a means of involving
more of the legal profession in the program, and of insuring maintenance of high
professional standards. Citizens Advocate Center, Studies supra. However, this option
involved conflict of interest problems, insofar as the agency would be responsible for
representation of both sides of a case involving the government and a legal services
client. Both HEW and HUD were seen as agencies with sympathies, constituencies, and
programs similar to those of OEO, but subordination of legal services within a line
department would reduce its visibility and hence its symbolic importance. Furthermore,
the same problems of political interference would be possible so long as a Cabinet officer
had responsibility for the program. Responsiveness to the client group would be mlinil-
mized, and the objectives of the program subordinated to those of the mission of the
department. Id. The ABA study, like the Cahns' report, recognized the "great appeal"
of locating the program in the Administrative Office of the Courts of the Judicial Branch
because it would "increase public confidence in the rule of law," as well as insulate
the program. ABA JoINT INFOPMATIONAL REPORT, supra, at 26. But the study noted that
the institutions were already overburdened by administrative duties and "non-judicial
functions," and had significant "funding difficulties." Id. at 27-28. The study considered
sixty governmental bodies as possible models for the independent legal services entity,
categorizing them into four groups: independent agencies in the Executive Branch,
government-owned corporations, private non-profit corporations which receive federal
funding, and private profit-making corporations established by congressional enactment.
Id. at 59-129. The above studies were made available to officials in the White House
responsible for writing the Administration's legislative proposals, as well as to Congress.
men and their staffs. Possibly the most influential document supporting the creation
of a Corporation was the REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ExEcuTivE ORGANIZA-
TION, see note 4 supra. The Report recommended the establishment of such a corporation
as a step toward "reprivatization" of the legal services program. It said: "While govern.
ment support is still necessary the need is not as strong today. The program has gen-
erated considerable interest and support in the private sector .... " The reprivatization
approach, implying an end to government funding, strongly set this study apart front
the others cited above.
107. Interview with Macy, supra note 12. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting
has come under sharp criticism for deleting or delaying programs which were considered
critical of the government or of private companies that contribute funds. Sec Variety,
Oct. 13, 1971, at 21, col. 1, and N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1971, at 91, col. 4; id., Oct, 17, 1971,
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kind the legislation is designed to prevent. More often, intervention
has come from local institutions or officials-mayors, CAA's, bar asso-
ciations, and state executives-who are targets of legal services suits or
whose spheres of influence in the community are challenged by advo-
cates for the poor.
Nonetheless, the new legislation would give the Corporation a fresh
opportunity and a clear mandate to take further steps to insure that the
program is "free from extraneous interference and control."1 08 Con-
gress has made plain its intent that legal services attorneys should "en-
joy the same protection from interference" as private attorneys.10
Throughout the statute there are indications that Congress expects
the Corporation to formulate more detailed and specific standards
and guidelines expressing policies. For example, in addition to promul-
gating eligibility standards10 the Corporation is required to "establish
such procedures" as may be necessary to provide poverty lawyers and
clients the same protection from interference in the attorney-client
relationship as private attorneys and their clients enjoy;' to "estab-
lish procedures for the conduct of legal services progranis assisted by
the Corporation," including supervision by a governing board;112 and
to prohibit legal services attorneys from engaging in any outside law
practice "unless permitted as pro bono publico activity pursuant to
guidelines established by the Corporation."'113
§ 2, at 19, col. 1. "The problem is that the corporation is forced to exist in limbo
between public and private spheres," Macy said, "with the perception in both places
that it's really a government agency and subject to pressure." Interview with Macy supra.
The CPB depends at present on Congress for 35 million of its $40 million budget (1972),
with the remaining $5 million contributed privately, almost all by maJor corporations.
Legislation has been introduced in this session of Congress to provide for appropriations
by pre-determined formula every year. See H.R. 7443, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971). Other
arrangements are also under cdnsideration. "Our principal task," Macy said, 'is long
range financing. It's vital." Interview with Macy, supra note 12. The New York Times
recently commented editorially: "It is obvious that unless public broadcasting is funded
on a regular instead of a beggar basis, both national and local producing arms will
become gun-shy and avoid the major themes and concerns that the American people
deserve to have aired, especially in the realm of public affairs." N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1971,
at 46, col. 2.
108. The Bill § 1001(6).
109. Id. § 1006(a)(7).
110. Id. § 1006(a)(8).
111. Id. § 1006(a)(7).
112. Id. § 1006(b)(6).
113. Id. § 1006(d). In addition, the Corporation must specify in regulations 'te criteria
it will apply in approving funding applications. Id. § 1006(b)(4). Records with respect
to contracts and grants must be open to the public, Id. § 1008(a), and all reports of
evaluations and inspections must be available to the grantee or contractee, Id. § 1008(b).
Guidelines and regulations must be published in the Federal Register, following notice
and reasonable opportunity for- comment. Id. § 1008(c). These provisions, in addition to
the availability of all fils and documents to Government Accounting Office auditors,
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Although Congress' decision to delegate responsibility for policy-
setting and responsiveness is fundamental to the legislation, Congress
may properly intervene if the Corporation fails to set such standards
and guidelines. Congress would probably be more inclined to defer
to a Corporation which defines and enforces policies and develops
formulae for allocating control to the competing constituencies. To a
large extent then, the independence of the Corporation would depend
on its competence-and on its appearance of competence-in policy-
setting and responsiveness. 114 The lack of such competence would pro-
Id. § 1010, should substantially tighten the administrative, record-keeping, and manage.
ment aspects of the program.
In addition, the bill would give projects certain procedural rights in case OLS denies
refunding, which now exist only if a project is officially terminated in the midst of the
program year. Applications for renewal of financial assistance would not be rejected,
under the bill, unless OLS provided "reasonable notice and opportunity for timely,
full and fair hearing." The Bill § 1014(2). At present, in case of denial of refunding,
OLS must afford a project only "reasonable notice and opportunity to show cause why
such action should not be taken." 42 U.S.C. § 2944(2); 45 C.F.R. § 1067.2 (1971). Only
in case of termination is a hearing currently required. 42 U.S.C. § 2944(3) (1970); 45
C.F.R. § 1067.1. A "full and fair hearing" would almost certainly mean that projects
would be guaranteed a formal, recorded proceeding, with opportunity to participate in
questioning officials and access to official evaluations. The procedure presently applied
in refunding denials increases the power and discretion of the OLS. This procedure--and
the problems it raises-are illustrated by the OLS decision to merge (and thereby deny
refunding to) the Monmouth County Legal Services Organization in New Jersey (MLSO)
with the neighboring Ocean County Legal Services Project. A strongly critical evaluation
of MLSO indicated that there was "little or no law reform"; the bar dominated the
governing board (by appointing nine of its seventeen members); and all controversial
cases had to be cleared in advance with the project director. Auerbach Associates Inc.,
Evaluation Report, Monmouth County Legal Services Program, New Jersey, Oct. 23,
1970. Prior to the merger, OLS offered the project an opportunity to submit written
materials and attend an "informal meeting." Letter from Ronald Dietrich, Acting Dep-
uty Director of OLS, to Lawrence C. Stamelman, Chairman, Monmouth County Legal
Services Organization, Dec. 16, 1970. The merger decision was explained on the grounds
that the program was "severely deficient" and that a "merged program" would be
capable of "increased specialization" and more effective "recruiting of talented lawyers,"
Letter from Dietrich to Stamelman, Feb. 24, 1971. Filing suit against OEO officials, the
project requested a preliminary injunction against the merger, on the grounds that OLS'
refusal of a formal hearing denied them due process. Judge Lacey declined to grant
the injunction, but he sharply criticized the "cavalier handling" by OLS of the project
and the "flagrant disregard of its own regulations." Monmouth County Legal Services
Organization v. Frank Carlucci, Civil No. 1137-71 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 1971). He pointed
to the refusal of OLS to give the project a copy of the Auerbach Evaluation, its failure
to discuss other sources of information on which it relied for its merger decision (including
extensive consultation with the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs), and the
refusal of leading OLS officials to testify and present written evidence in the proceeding.
Id. The OLS officials, noted Judge Lacey, seemed to be claiming "absolute, unchecked
and unreviewable discretion," and had shown "their own lack of respect" for the legal
system. Id. Nonetheless, he felt "constrained to hold that technically the OEO action
was a denial of refunding and not a termination and, accordingly, that OEO acted in
conformity with appropriate statutory and regulatory provisions." Id. Although Lacey's
comments struck a common cause of resentment on the part of many projects, OLS
officials thought the criticism to be unfair (while welcoming the holding). Interview with
P. Vaughn Gearan, Regional Director of OLS, Region Two, in Washington, D.C., Sept.
16, 1971.
114. See note 90 supra.
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vide critics with a ready rationale to challenge the justification for the
Corporation's autonomy.
There are two primary reasons for which Congress should be con-
cerned with policysetting. The first is the necessity for choice result-
ing from the scarcity of government funding. Under foreseeable
levels of appropriations, the government will not even come close
to allocating sufficient funds to provide lawyers for all who need
legal services. 115 As long as demand outruns supply the program will
be forced to allocate its services among those in need.110 There will
thus be a need to formulate rationing policies which express the pro-
gram's priorities and a notion of procedural fairness. Without a policy,
rationing will at best be accomplished by queuing; at worst it will be-
come arbitrary. Adequate policysetting assures that priorities, when
formulated, will be effected in practice, and that there will be a cer-
tain minimum consistency and fairness of operation whereby indi-
viduals in like situations will be dealt with alike.
The second reason for the importance of policysetting is the neces-
sity for delegation of authority. A considerable amount of discretion
and policymaking responsibility on major issues will be given to those
who administer local programs. Delineating responsibility thus be-
comes vital. The Corporation must make clear which decisions or
which parts of a decision are delegated, and to whom the responsibility
is assigned at the local level."17
115. At a funding level of approximately $60 million for fiscal )ear 1971, it oras
estimated that "four out of every five legal problems of the poor go unattended:'. Presi-
dent Nixon, Message to Congress, supra note 1. The program served appro.imately
eighteen per cent of the "universe of need" for legal assistance in 1970, according to
Frank Carlucci, then Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, 1971 Senate
Hearings, supra note 106, pt. 1, at 145.
116. A distinction should be made between those who need legal services and those
who express that need, since only a portion of those who have legal problems will
actually come into a neighborhood law office. The high caseloads of legal services at-
torneys and the necessity in many projects of rejecting on other grounds individuals
who are financially eligible, however, attest to the inability of supply to keep up even
with expressed demand.
117. The confusion on this issue is illustrated by the President's Veto Statement. The
President argued that the "sole interest" of each board member must be the "public
interest," and "the sole constituency he must represent is the whole American people."
Therefore, he argued, the board members should be appointed by "the one official
accountable to, and answerable to the whole American people," the President, and he
should be given a "free hand" subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. But, in
apparent contradiction, the President also contended that the Legal Sen ices Corporation
must place "the needs of low income clients first, before political concerns of either
legal services attorneys or elected officials." The President's Message to the Senate
Returning S.2007 without His Approval, supra note 2. A number of Congressmen disputed
the President's argument. In a supplemental comment on H.R. 12350, added to the
Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor, seven members of the Presi-
dent's party said: "The need for independence is clear-but there is need for account-
ability as well. Members of this Committee, both in hearings and in the Conference
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B. Responsiveness: The Allocation of Power
A normative analysis of responsiveness will provide criteria for
assessing the claims of constituencies; for distinguishing legitimate
claims from illegitimate ones, and thereby identifying political inter-
ference. The Corporation may use criteria other than those suggested
below, but it must define some criteria by which to allocate political
control among the various competing constituencies.
The determination of appropriate degrees of control should depend
on two criteria: the impact of the program on members of the con-
stituency, i.e., its effect on their lives or their interests, and the con-
tributions which the members of the constituency may make to the
program in terms of resources and expertise. Other criteria, some of
them incompatible with impact and contributions, are available but
embody substantial defects. 118
Committee from both sides of the aisle, struggled with the problem of accountability
in attempting to insure that the Corporation would be responsive to the Congress, tile
Executive Branch, professional considerations and the Bar, as well as respond to tile
primary concern of the client representation. . . . In our view the present Title X
creates a Corporation more accountable to these various interests than either the original
bi-partisan or Administration bills." H.R. Doc. No. 355, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1972).
Representative Carl Perkins, Chairman of the Committee, commented during the House
debate on the legislation: "Congress too is concerned with accountability and the need
to create a corporate entity that would be responsive ....... 118 CONG. REc. H1061
(daily ed. Feb. 16, 1972). But Representative Quie countered: "The only way one can
get accountability is for the President to have a free hand to appoint the members of
the board ... " 118 CONG. REC. H1213 (daily ed, Feb. 17, 1972).
118. Perhaps the major alternative would be a criterion of representativeness, re-
quiring the degree of responsiveness to a particular constituency to depend only on the
number of members it has, relative to the others. This criterion fails to take Into
account the very great differences of impact which the program may have on the lives
of different types of constituents, and would in practice allow the poor little control
over decisions which affect their lives.
Other criteria, such as political power, have more serious deficiencies. The argument
for the criterion of political power would be that the public good is best determined
by a kind of free market interplay of different interest groups, whose power may not
be proportional to numerical strength, and that the claims of constituencies to respon.
siveness should be judged in accordance with the pressure they are able to bring to
bear through specified channels (e.g., through elected officials) in the political process.
This criterion, however, would cloud the distinction between responsiveness and political
interference, even if pressure were confined to certain channels of expression, and the
program would soon become captive to the special interests of the most powerful groups,
many of them contrary to the interests of the poor or the community.at-large.
Another possible criterion would be adverseness of interest, or opposi~ion to the pro.
gram. This criterion would differ from the one of "impact" recommended by this Note
in taking account only of potential or actual damage to a constituency's interests, and
excluding consideration of any beneficial or positive effects it might have. It would make
the program responsive mostly to those it threatens. The rationale for this criterion
would be that a program with so great a tendency to hurt certain groups (private
lawyers, or opponents of legal services clients), or which encounters so much opposition
from those groups, should accord them a higher degree of responsiveness. If tile cozn-
plaints of opponents were answered and their hostility eased, the program might also be
more effective. The price of such involvement, however, is likely to be a compromise
of vital goals and interests at the expense of those served.
A variant of the political power criterion is responsiveness to a single elected official,
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The use of impact as a criterion is supported by the principle that
individuals ought to have a degree of control over the institutions
which affect their lives, and that a program which has very different
effects on different constituencies ought to be most responsive to those
on whom its effects are greatest. This analysis is supported by the guid-
ing principle of the federal antipoverty program, the "maximum fea-
sible participation" of the poor.""0 The use of this criterion also aids
the legal services program in achieving one of its most important objec-
tives: changing the attitudes of the poor toward their own lives, the
legal process and the institutions of society. A program which does
things for or to the poor without their control, in the manner of the
old social services programs, is likely to have a smaller effect on their
attitudes than one which involves them in the essential decisionmaking
of the program. 20
The criterion of contribution would enable the program to take ac-
count of potential inputs of resources, expertise and information from
the various constituencies in allocating degrees of participation and
control among them. Responsiveness to these constituencies provides
an incentive or reward for their contributions, and also a means by
which such contributions may be delivered.
Political interference, by this analysis, is a claim to excessive control
over legal services projects--a claim that is not warranted by the pro-
such as the President. Such a criterion might have the virtue of simplicity, nd would
give one democratically selected individual responsibility for deciding the merits of
constituencies' claims. But.it would most likely amount to much the same system as now
exists, with most of the same deficiencies. In any event, this criterion would be clearly
contrary to the legislative intent that the poor should participate in decisionmaking.
see note 119 infra, and would possess the same deficiencies as the criterion of political
power.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2791(f)(1) (1970). This section provides that Community Action
Agency boards should facilitate "maximum feasible participation of residents of the
areas and members of the groups served, so as to best stimulate and take full advantage
of capabilities for self-advancement and' assure that those programs and projects arc
otherwise meaningful to and widely utilized by their intended beneficiaries.' According
to 42 U.S.C. § 2791(b), a CAA board must be composed of "at least one third . . .
persons chosen in accordance with democratic selection procedures adequate to assure
that they are representative of the poor in the area served." Of the members, the total
number of which cannot exceed fifty-one, one-third must be "public officials" (unless
they are unwilling to serve), and the remainder are to be "officials or members of
business, industry, labor, religious, welfare, education or other major groups and interests
in the community." These provisions were added in the Economic Opportunity Amend-
ments of 1967. Act of Dec. 23, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, 81 Stat. 672 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2809 (1970)). However, the phrase "maximum feasible participation" was used in the
legislation first passed by Congress, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1954, defining a
Community Action Program as a pTogram "which is developed, conducted and admin-
istered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of areas and members of
the groups served .... Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88452, § 203(a)(3), 78 Stat. 58
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2791(f)(1) (1970)).
120. See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 14. See also Cahn & Cahn, What Price justice:
The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 Noa D. ME L. REv. 927 (1966).
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gram's impact on a constituency or the constituency's contribution to
the program. By contrast, proper intervention consists of claims which
are warranted by impact and contribution and which do not violate
other particular values, constitutional prohibitions or ethical restric-
tions such as the attorney-client relationship. A claim might relate to
the structure of an institution, for example a general claim to greater
representation on the governing board or control over the funds re-
ceived by the delegate project. Or it might relate to eligibility or serv-
ices, for example, a claim on a particular issue asking for a change in
policy. The legitimacy of a particular constituency's claim will vary
from issue to issue. Furthermore, the criteria of impact and contribu-
tion will often conflict. The client community may be the most af-
fected by a decision, while the bar may have the most expertise. When
this occurs, the competing claims must be balanced against one an-
other. It cannot be pretended that an analysis of impact and contribu-
tions will yield precise solutions. An analysis of the problem based on
those two considerations, however, will be sufficiently sensitive to
guide the kinds of decisions necessary for the allocation of decision-
making power and responsibility within the program.
C. Proper Degrees of Responsiveness: Comparing the Constituencies
Applying this analysis, the Corporation should stipulate in general
terms how control over the program should be allocated among the
four major constituencies: the community at large, the professional
community, the client community and the legal services attorneys.
1. The community at large has a significant claim to be represented
at the national level of government, arising from its contribution of
tax revenues for the program's operation. In the case of any other pub-
lic program, this contribution would justify virtually any legislative
evaluation, alteration or reform. But in the case of legal services, Con-
gress has explicitly indicated its intent to defer to the Corporation on
day-to-day or even year-to-year decisions. Such deference is implied in
the Corporation's mandate for independence.121 Without some measure
of deference, the Corporation's much-heralded autonomy would be
meaningless. 122 Yet the fact that the Corporation will have to seek
yearly appropriations from Congress suggests that a degree of repre-
121. See p. 264 supra.
122. Of course, any attempt to influence the handling of a particular case which
has been accepted by a legal services attorney would be presumed to violate the attorney.
client relationship.
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sentation of the community at large will take place, though this may be
limited to occasional long-range policy review.
The role of Congress at the national level would be sufficient to
satisfy claims based on the contribution of the community at large. At
the local level, this constituency's contributions have been negligible
in terms of funds and expertise.123 Contributions at the national level
do not justify additional claims to responsiveness made at the local level
by a mayor, governor, or other public official.
At both the national and local levels, the impact of the program upon
the community at large is more diffuse than upon the client com-
munity. Particular law reform cases, such as school desegregation suits
or challenges to the welfare department, may accelerate long run social
change or contribute to tax increases in the short run. But these may
be the effects of a variety of phenomena, only one of which may be
litigation by legal services projects. The claims of the community at
large deriving from the program's impact would seem to be answered
by the congressional decision to create an independent Corporation,
and Congress' continuing prerogative to periodically review its gen-
eral operations. These claims do not justify the ad hoc influence
which many public officials have sought to exercise in the past.
124
2. The claim of the organized bar derives primarily from the im-
pact of the program on the livelihoods of lawyers, resulting from com-
petition with legal services attorneys who can offer their services for
free because they are subsidized by the government. The number of
clients actually drawn away from private counsel who are capable of
paying for the particular service sought has never been measured. It is
likely that legal services projects have served some clients who could
have stretched their financial means to afford private counsel for some
kinds of services. 125 But since eligibility requirements were keyed,
123. Interview with Duggan, supra note 20. Interview with Speaker, supra note 15. If
the local share requirement were eliminated, as would be anticipated under the Bill,
these contributions could be expected to drop even further, as local projects would not
solicit them as energetically to make up the twenty per cent share.
124. See note 83 supra.
125. There is some evidence that the competitive impact of the program may be
borne in large measure by black attorneys practicing in poor communities. A prominent
black lawyer and publisher from San Francisco recently told a congressional committee
that he favored a "judicare" program, with payments to private lawy'ers for service to
poor clients, because: "The black law firms consistently dry up because no matter what
you say, you are taking away from these black law firms our clientele so that we don't
have an opportunity to develop a spawning ground for young lawyers to come in, and
if they came in, we would not be in a position to pay them because you are taking
money out of the community .... ." Testimony of Thomas Berkley at Hearings on
Oversight into Administration of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1961 Before the
Special Hearing Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on Education and Labor,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. 174-214 (1971).
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inter alia, to low income and a refusal by private attorneys to accept a
case, one must suspect that the number of clients actually taken from
the private bar has been relatively small. 120
The bar has generally been assumed to make a contribution of ex-
pertise, through its governing board members, that guards against any
dilution of professional standards in the operation of the program.
But this supposed contribution rests on a very suspect assumption:
that the professional conduct of legal services lawyers should be sub-
ject to a special form of professional oversight or scrutiny not applied
to private practitioners. There is no reason to expect that the standards
embodied in the Canons of Ethics and the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility and enforced by local bar associations will provide insufficient
protection against improper conduct by legal services attorneys. No
extra mechanisms, such as "watchdog" representation on governing
boards, are required. Indeed, to the extent that such demands for spe-
cial scrutiny are motivated by a general hostility to legal services from
certain elements of the bar, evaluations of projects by teams of indi-
viduals, including lawyers, from outside the community may provide
more impartial and penetrating criticisms and suggestions for upgrad-
ing quality.
The private bar has also made some contribution of time by repre-
senting clients in simple matters and advising less-experienced project
attorneys. These services have been counted as an "in-kind" portion
of the twenty per cent local share required for OEO funding grants.
But the extent of such volunteering has never been more than mar-
ginally significant to the program, and the local share requirement
would be eliminated in the Corporation legislation . 2T Furthermore,
whatever claim to responsiveness may be derived from volunteer serv-
ices is a claim that belongs to a relatively small number of lawyers who
may not identify with the leadership of the organized bar. The claims
of the bar, though real, thus warrant less extensive control over legal
services than that constituency has exercised in the past.128
126. Although statistics have never been compiled, project directors rarely rely
heavily on volunteer manpower, since it is unpredictable in both quantity and quality.
Particularly for important law reform cases, which may require full-time attention from
a staff attorney, they tend to depend on their own staff. Such volunteer time has been
significant only because projects were able to count hours spent by volunteer attorneys
as contributions toward the local share at rates which the volunteer attorneys normally
would have billed clients. Interview with Dugan, supra note 77. Interview with Paul
Newman, Regional Director of OLS, Northeast Region, in Washington, D.C., Sept. 16, 1971.
127. See note 95 supra.
128. See pp. 247-50 supra.
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3. The main impact of the legal services program is on members
of the client community. Clients have a tremendous stake in decisions
as to who gets services, what types of services will be available, which
problems will get priority, which resources will be devoted to law
reform, and which community groups will be represented. The impact
of such decisions is palpable and direct for the poor, particularly when
limitations on resources compel choices among recipients of the service.
The poor also make significant contributions to the program. They
may bring to policymaking bodies knowledge of community problems
that is unavailable from other sources. In addition, they can provide
links between project attorneys and neighborhood residents through
effective canvassing and organization (outreach) and can mobilize
support for the program when it is under attack. Though legal services
attorneys may sometimes advance the interests of the client community,
representatives of this constituency should be primarily people eligible
for legal services. 129 Clients seem to have been underrepresented in the
past, for a consideration of the impact of the program on them and
their potential contribution to the program suggests that the client
community should receive the greatest degree of control afforded to
any single constituency.
4. Although they are employees of the program, legal services at-
torneys also have a strong claim to participation in its governance.
Their status differs from that of partners in a private law firm pri-
marily because of the fact of government funding. Yet each grantee
project has many of the characteristics of a law partnership, and the
source of funding should not totally disqualify legal services attorneys
from participation in their project's decision-making. The program has
an important impact on their lives, not merely because their personal
incomes depend on it, but because they are the ones who must carry
out decisions of policy, and their professional careers are often at
stake. Aside from their normal service to clients at relatively low sal-
aries, they contribute invaluable expertise to governing boards, much
overtime for which they are never paid, and they volunteer assistance
to community organizations. Unresponsiveness to this constituency
might result in a diminution or disappearance of many of these con-
tributions and perhaps a large number of resignations as well.130
129. See notes 10 & 49 supra.
130. The above discussion is based on the assumption that legal services will continue
to involve grants to projects with full-time staff attorneys. An alternative supported by
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III. Options for the Legal Services Corporation
A. Policies in the Legislation
Though there is abundant evidence of a congressional desire for
policysetting and standards of responsiveness, 131 the proposed legisla-
tion would impose few specific policies on the Corporation. The com-
position and method of selection of the Corporation's board of directors
is described in detail, heavily weighting the balance of power in favor
of the community at large and the professional community.18 2 But only
a few of the Corporation's responsibilities are specified (the appoint-
ment of the director being one), and the division of authority to be
many bar members would be adoption of a judicare approach to the funding and
delivery of services. A judicare approach would involve government payments directly
to private attorneys for providing representation to certified poor clients, much as the
Medicare program now operates. It has been argued that such an approach would reduce
the possibility of interference because it would bring all representation decisions under
the protection of the attorney-client relationship. See Preloznik, Wisconsin Judcare, 70
W. VA. L. REV. 326, 328 (1968). In addition it would eliminate the very visible (and
vulnerable) legal services bureaucracy, and create greater incentives among the private
bar for the expansion of funding for legal services. Studies of initial experiments, how.
ever, have indicated that judicare programs have higher average costs per case than
most projects and virtually no law reform activity. John D. Kettelle Corporation, Evalu-
ation of Wisconsin Judicare, September, 1970. "Judicare has known little litigation
outside of domestic relations, bankruptcies, and terminations of joint tenancy .... #
Id. See also Robb, Alternate Legal Assistance Plans, 14 CATHOLIC LAwYzR 127 (1968).
Masotti and Corsi, Legal Assistance for the Poor: An Analysis and Evaluation of Two
Programs, 44 J. URBAN L. 483 (1967).
131. See note 113 supra.
132. The Bill § 1004(a). The Corporation Board of Directors would be appointed
by the President, with the consent of the Senate. One board member would be elected
annually by the board to serve as chairman. Six of the members would be appointed
from the "general public," though at least three of them would have to be attorneys.
Two members would be selected from lists of nominees submitted by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, and five members (one per list) from lists submitted
by the following organizations: the American Bar Association, the American Trial
Lawyers Association, the National Bar Association, the National Legal Aid and De-
fender Organization, and the Association of American Law Schools. Two members would
be appointed from among individuals eligible for services from lists submitted by the
Clients Advisory Council. Finally, two members would be former legal services attorneys,
chosen from lists submitted by the Project Attorneys Advisory Council. Each Initial list,
and any subsequent list submitted at the President's request, would include not less than
three nor more than ten names for each position. It is thus certain that a majority of
the members will be appointed from the professional community, since the President
must appoint a minimum of ten from that constituency, apart from attorneys who are
former employees of legal services projects. The President, representing the community
at large, has substantial discretion in selecting members, since he may reject all the names
on a list submitted by any of the nominating groups, and there is no limit on the
number of new lists he may request. In effect, the legislation gives the community at
large the power to pick a controlling majority composed of professional community
representatives, as well as those of their own constituency. Moreover, the fact that the
Project Attorneys Council may nominate only former employees of projects means that
legal services attorneys would be given only indirect representation.
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made between the Corporation and its grantees is nowhere defined."33
The bill would also establish two eleven-member advisory councils,
133. There is the additional problem of how the legal services provided by the Cor-
poration should be related to existing programs of legal services funded by the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare. Such programs outside OEO involved expenditures of roughly $7 million
in fiscal year 1970, barely ten per cent of the $60 million OEO legal services budget,
but funding might well be expanded by these Departments on competing or comple-
mentary projects. The Bill would authorize the Corporation to "offer advice and assist-
ance" to all federal programs, which would include "reviewing all grants and contracts"
for the provision of legal services and "making recommendations to the appropriate
federal agency." The Bill § 1006(a)(6). It would also include "reviewing and making
recommendations to the President and Congress concerning any proposal" for legal
services., Id. The Corporation would also be authorized, upon request of the President,
to provide "training, technical assistance, monitoring and evaluation services to any
federally assisted legal services program." Id.
Through its Model Cities Program, HUD has funded legal services in thirty-eight
cities, with an expenditure of $4.2 million in fiscal year 1971. NAT'. J., April 24, 1971,
at 899. The decision to use funds for this purpose belongs to the City Demonstration
Agency, which is the official recipient of the federal grant. See Demonstration Cities
and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 3301 el seq. But HUD has
encouraged these local agencies to support legal services since late 1968. HUD Policy
Memorandum No. 21, from Walter Farr, Jr., Model Cities Administrator, to all CDA
Directors, re Utilization of Legal Services Resources in Model Cities Programs, December
18, 1968. HUD has generally been more willing than OLS to accept restrictions imposed
on the operation of legal services. Some projects, for example, have been prohibited
by City Demonstration Agencies from suing local governments. Memorandum from
Jason Newman, Special Counsel, OLS, to Frank Jones, July 24, 1970. At least one OLS
Regional Director has complained that the OLS position "is being seriously undermined
by the willingness of the Model Cities program to make its funds available" to programs
which OLS is attempting to free from restrictions. Memorandum from Maurice Finkel-
stein, Regional Director of OLS, Middle-Atiantic Region, to Frank Jones, re Charlotte
North Carolina Legal Services Program-Relationship with the Model Cities Agency,
March 23, 1970.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has funded legal services in two
forms: first, a group of experimental or pilot programs under the authority of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1970), and second, state-wide programs in support
of services provided to welfare recipients under 45 C.F.R. §§ 220.51(c)(4), 220.64(b), 2V.59,
222.91 (1971). Funding of experimental and demonstration projects has been at an
annual rate of approximately $1.1 million. Interview with Herbert Kaplow. Community
Services Administration, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, by telephone,
Sept. 17, 1971. Many judicare experiments have been tried; none has been coordinated
with legal services projects. Funding for state-wide programs was estimated at $3 million
for fiscal year 1971. Id. Only three states now have such prograns-Penns)hanla, Mary-
land and Georgia-but the congressional appropriation is open.ended under the current
law, so that the federal government is obligated to provide seventy-five per cent of
the funding for any state-wide program funded twenty-five per cent with state money.
States are strongly encouraged to initiate such programs by State Letter No. 1053, from
Mary E. Switzer, Administrator, Social and Rehabilitation Service, Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, to State Agencies Administering Approved Public Assistance
Plans, Nov. 8, 1968.
The powers of the Corporation over the HEW and HUD programs are far narrower
in scope than proponents of the Corporation idea first hoped. The Corporation's re-
sponsibilities with respect to these programs are confined primarily to review and
consultation. The original proponents of the Corporation wanted it to have the power
to take over the HEW and HUD efforts. In the first proposal for an independent
legal services entity, a subcommittee of the National Advisory Committee chaired by
former director Earl Johnson recommended the creation of a National Justice Foun-
dation with the power to assume "full responsibility for the administration of" all
other legal services funded by the federal government. Legislative Subcommittee, The
National Advisory Committee, A Proposal for the Establishment of a National Justice
Foundation, March 24, 1969, § 201(a). One of the major objectives of the Foundation
would have been to prevent competition among federally funded legal services programs,
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one for clients and the other for project attorneys. 13 4 Their only speci-
fied responsibility would be to suggest to the President possible nom-
inees to the national board as representatives of these two constitu-
encies.13
The bill would formalize for the first time the existence of local
governing boards, but would provide only a very general mandate as
to their composition and responsibilities. It states merely that the
boards must be "policymaking," that a majority of their members must
be lawyers, and that at least one third of their members must be "mem-
bers of the client community."'31 6 The bill does not outline the role
and responsibilities of local bar associations in any greater detail than
did the previous legislation, leaving the Corporation broad administra-
tive discretion. It would eliminate the requirement that the director
insure that state and local bar associations be "consulted" prior to
project funding. 37 Instead, the Corporation would be required merely
to "notify the state bar association . . . at a reasonable time prior to
the Corporation's approval" of any grant.138 The bill would also presage
a fundamental change in the role of CAA's and their relationship to
legal services projects. For the first time in its history, the legal services
program would be independent of Community Action. Nowhere in the
to halt proliferation of staff, and to insure comprehensive planning. Letter from
Johnson to Representative William Steiger, March 12, 1969; Letter from Johnson to the
author, Nov. 30, 1971. The support of the ABA was sought with the argument that
there was a need to "consolidate all legal services programs in a new independent
agency in which the organized bar would have a significant voice." Letter from Jerome
Shestack, member, the NAC Legislative Subcommittee, to Bert Early, Executive Director,
ABA, Feb. 13, 1969. The reduction in the Corporation's proposed powers over non.OEO
legal services programs apparently resulted from a political calculation on the part of
the bi-partisan coalition that a "takeover" of all federal programs would provoke oppo.
sition from the departments and necessitate broader legislation, thereby complicating
and jeopardizing the creation of the Corporation. Interview with Michael Kantor, former
Assistant to the Director of OLS, in Washington, D.C., Aug. 25, 1971.
134. The Clients Advisory Council would be selected from among "individuals eligible
for assistance," while the Project Attorneys Advisory Council would consist of lawyers
"who are actively engaged in providing legal services." The former would "advise" tile
board and executive director on "policy matters relating to the needs of the client
community," in addition to acting as "liaison" between the client community and legal
services programs. The latter would "advise" on "policy matters relating to the furnish-
ing of legal services." Both would have responsibility, in addition, for submitting lists
of nominees for appointment by the President to the board of directors. For details of
the appointment process, see note 132 supra. The board of directors itself would be
authorized to fix the procedures and method of selection, of the Advisory Councils, as
well as the terms of office and qualifications. For both Councils, such procedures would
"insure that all areas of the country and significant segments" of each constituency
were represented. In no event could more than one representative on a Council be
from any one state. The Bill § 1005(a), (b).
135. Id. § 1005.
136. Id. § 1006(b)(6).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2809(3) (1970).
138. The Bill § 1006(h).
274
Vol. 81: 231, 1971
The Legal Services Corporation and Political Interference
proposed legislation is Community Action mentioned, and the auton-
omy of the Corporation would remove any presumption that projects
would be funded as delegate agencies of local CAA's.l'2
With respect to eligibility, the Corporation would be authorized to
establish standards providing "priority for members of the client com-
munity whose means are least adequate to obtain private legal serv-
ices."'140 No definitions are provided, however, for "means" or "pri-
ority."
141
With regard to services, the language and history of the legislation
indicate a general intent to encourage provision of a spectrum of
services as broad as that available through private lawyers.142 There
appears to be a presumption that services are permissible unless spe-
cifically restricted, as are criminal representation 143 and lobbying,144
but the legislation would establish no priorities among permissible
services.
B. Policy Options and Recommendations
1. Guidance and Supervision of the Program
a. The National Corporation. The legislation would give the
professional community and the community at large a degree of
representation that is not warranted under the impact-contribution
139. Indeed, there are strong reasons for reversing this presumption and funding
legal services projects directly. See pp. 249-50 supra. If the projects continue to be
delegates, the type of interference which has plagued many programs in the past may
become a more significant problem under revenue sharing plans such as the one pre-
sented by President Nixon. See The President's Address to the Nation, supra note 14.
Under revenue sharing, the CAA's would become beholden to local governments for all
funds which have now come directly from OEO, and would have to "compete" with
other local private and public agencies for such funds. ,Memorandum from Frank
Carlucci, Director of OEO, to all CAA Board Chairmen, Feb. 13, 1971. Dependent on
the favor of local officials for their funding, CAA's would therefore have an even
stronger incentive to discourage their delegate legal services projects from undertaking
controversial suits, particularly those which challenged practices or policies of the
local government.
140. Id. § 1006(a)(8).
141. The Bill has no provision on group representation, but the Senate Report states:
"Client as used in this act can mean an individual or a group. The Committee has
specifically found that there is a substantial need for the representation of groups and
that such representation can be very effective in redressing problems in the client com-
munity." SENATE REPORT, supra note I at 36.
142. See generally HOUSE REPORT and SENAT REPoRtT. supra note 1.
143. The Bill § 1005(i). There would be a blanket prohibition on provision of services"with respect to any criminal proceedings," eliminating the flexibility in the present
statute.
144. The Bill § 1006(e). Legal Services attorneys would be forbidden to lobby unless
they were either representing a client or responding to a "request" for such "representa-
tion" from a legislator, and would be forbidden to engage in any "campaign of adver-
tising" using the media, and certain forms of direct action such as rallying or picketing.
275
The Yale Law Journal
analysis suggested above. On the seventeen-member board these two
constituencies together would have thirteen representatives, with the
bar accounting for a minimum of ten, as compared to the two repre-
sentatives each allotted to the client community and legal services
attorneys. A partial redress of this imbalance may be achieved by the
President if he appoints four or five of the "public members" to be,
in effect, representatives of the poor. Such individuals might include
officials of national organizations identified with the poor, lawyers who
have been closely identified with the program for some time or actual
members of the client community.
More important than the number or percentage of client community
members on the board, however, may be the quality of their perform.
ance. They begin with a number of substantial disadvantages similar
to the handicaps encountered by client community members of local
boards in the past. They will lack the organizational strength and lob-
bying power of national professional organizations and the valuable
status of being recognized "spokesmen" for their constituency. 146 They
will lack experience with administrative and accounting procedures
used to operate a large corporation and will be more likely than other
members to be inhibited by the august setting and tone of the meetings.
Special measures may be desirable to compensate for these disadvan-
tages. Additional funds and energy should be devoted to building the
National Clients Council as an organization with spokesmen and grass-
roots strength. Special preparation should be provided for client com-
munity representatives, possibly through informal consultation between
the Corporation staff and representatives of the poor. These board
members might be encouraged to take a particularly active role in the
selection of the chairman of the board and the executive director of
the Corporation and in the appointments of chairmen of standing
committees of the board.
As an official instrument of representation, the Clients Advisory
Council should be given a clearly defined role-consultative, at a mini.
mum-with respect to the operation of the program, including budget,
evaluation and staff. The decision of Congress to establish a separate
145. The heads of organizations of the poor, such as the National Welfare Rights
Organization or the National Clients Council, are often challenged on the grounds that
(i) their groups represent only a small segment of the low-income population, (ii) the
feelings of the segment represented may be different from those of many other low-
income individuals, and (iii) not even the individuals they claim to represent have any
direct role in choosing leaders of the organizations. Interview with Hamilton, supra
note 45.
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entity to represent the client community, with a specified role in the
selection of board members, is ample justification for giving the Coun-
cil broad oversight and investigative powers.114 The Council might be
allotted a portion of the budget for evaluation purposes, to commission
special assessments of projects by teams of specialists or by members of
the Council themselves. It might be allotted, as well, a part of the re-
search and development budget, to initiate experiments with particular
modes of legal services delivery or particular types of clients. Its role
might be viewed as a sort of legal services ombudsman, possibly even
with some staff of its own. One of its responsibilities might be to estab-
lish advisory councils at the local level in cooperation with the National
Clients Council 147 and build them into a network by serving as a cen-
tral point of communications and coordination.
b. Local Governing Boards. One of the Corporation's major tasks,
as suggested by this Note's impact-contribution analysis, would be to
realign the balance of representation and influence on local boards to
accord greater control to the client community and legal services at-
torneys. Under the legislation, two major approaches would be open
to the Corporation. First, the Corporation might require nothing more
than the statutory minima, fifty-one per cent attorneys and thirty-three
per cent members of the client community, and leave apportionment
of the remainder of seats to the governing boards themselves. As a
second approach, the Corporation might set affirmative representation
requirements supplementing those in the legislation. One variation
of this second approach would be to fix one or more of the minima
as a maximum: setting the percentage of attorneys on the board, for
example, at a maximum of fifty-one per cent. Another variation would
be to set one of the minima at a higher level than required by the leg-
islation. The Corporation might stipulate, for example, that forty-five
per cent of the board members must be from the client community
and that project attorneys have at least one representative on the board.
The aim of increasing the influence of the client community and
legal services attorneys would be best served by the second and third
options-the first would permit or even encourage the professional
community and the community at large to consolidate and enlarge
their dominance. The second option should be adopted to limit repre-
146. Though the legislation would not specify any responsibilities for the Advisory
Councils in addition to their involvement in selection of board members, the recognition
of the need for structured participation of client community members in this process
implies a justification for involvement in other areas. See note 184 supra.
147. See p. 245 and note 50 supra.
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sentation of the professional community, whose claims to responsive-
ness could certainly be served by less than a majority of board member-
ship if the legislation did not require it. In addition, a higher mini-
mum should be set for the client community, as exemplified by the
third option. Even with this combination of the second and third op-
tions, attorneys would constitute the majority on governing boards.
But the disproportionate strength of the bar on local governing boards
might be somewhat reduced if the Corporation provided that a certain
percentage of the attorney members be legal services attorneys from
the project's staff.
Also critical to the composition of the local boards will be the
method of selection adopted. Though a significant degree of latitude
might be allowed among forms of election and appointment, certain
practices should be definitely forbidden, such as a board appointing
its successors (or perpetuating itself indefinitely), or a private group
(e.g., the bar) appointing a majority.1 48
Redressing the past unresponsiveness to the poor may depend, as at
the national level, on the ability and performance of the client com-
munity members of boards, not merely on their number. Several
measures, among them the following, might be taken to aid these
members: special preparation in briefings and written materials for
board meetings; explanations of the background of issues, especially
if they are legal issues; adjustment of roles and procedures of meetings
to increase their participation, such as rotating the chairmanship; ar-
ranging the time of meetings so that they are convenient for the poor
(e.g., at night, so that those who work can attend); and setting the
place of meetings in a community center rather than in private law
offices downtown, in order to minimize inhibiting factors and encour-
age spectator attendance.
148. Resolving the methods for selecting governing board members would be one of
the most difficult and critical issues faced by the Corporation. Both the elective and
appointive methods have drawbacks. In special elections, turn-outs are usually abysmally
low and there would be difficulty in determining procedures for nominating and casting
ballots on a geographical or constituency-wide basis. Appointment would mean selection
by groups or organizations which might be unresponsive to the needs of the constituency
they supposedly represent. Apportionment of selection power among different groups,
with widely different degrees of responsiveness, would require great flexibility and
discretion, almost certainly undercutting the program's accountability. In the past,
elections have been extremely rare. A wide variety of groups have been given power of
appointment, including social service agencies, public officials, community action neigh.
borhood councils, or community action boards. In any case, it would seem desirable
to set certain minimum restrictions to prevent boards, for example, from becoming
self-perpetuating, and to attempt to insure that all board members are selected In a
way that makes them responsive to the constituency they are chosen to represent.
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The addition of a client's advisory council at the local level might
be useful if it were given specific funds and responsibility to prepare
periodic evaluations of the program. Such a council might also be given
power to suggest revisions in the budget before it is submitted to the
Corporation for funding; to veto particular hiring or firing decisions
unless overridden by a majority of the governing board; to have unre-
stricted access to clients and attorneys in gathering information; and
to prepare a "priorities report" outlining community problems in
terms of both law reform and individual representation, discussing
their relative importance.149 A number of observers have argued that
without this "separatist" approach to representation of the poor client
community members of governing boards will inevitably continue to
be "overwhelmed," "inhibited," "subtly put down," if not "shut up"
or shut out by other constituencies. 1 0
c. Division of Responsibilities. The Corporation must determine
how responsibility is to be divided in two respects: (1) between the
national board and the local governing boards and (2) between local
governing boards and their staff attorneys. Division of responsibility
in the first respect should depend to a large extent on how closely the
allocation of control over each institution in fact conforms to the
impact-contribution analysis presented above. If both the national
board and local boards conform to this analysis, a substantial delega-
tion of power would be desirable in order to allow flexibility in deal-
ing with varying local conditions. The extent of the responsibility to
be delegated should also depend on the issue to be decided, since con-
stituencies have claims of varying degrees of legitimacy on different
issues. For example, even if local boards remain under the excessive
control of local bar associations, a substantial degree of delegation to
149. The establishment of a local clients advisory council need not preent the gov-
erning board from serving in accordance with the legislation as the primary "policy.
making" body. The role of the council would be only consultative on most matters;
the governing board would be obliged to grant the council a hearing, but not necessarily
to follow its views. On other matters, however, the council might be given greater
authority and its role might be collaborative. For example, the council might have the
power to advise and consent to the hiring of specific staff members, subject to being
overridden by a majority vote of the governing board. This might include the power to
propose individuals for appointment by the board, in addition to assessing the board's
nominees. A personnel decision has particular importance to clients because it is their
only opportunity to decide in effect who will serve them as lawyers.
150. Interview with Hamilton, supra note 45. According to Maryellen Hamilton, "poor
folks just can't have much say on the boards." Likewise. Jean Cahn contends that there
is little prospect of clients having a significant impact on the program through partici-
pation on such boards, because they are almost always "manipulated" or "outvoted."
Interview with Cahn, supra note 45. See also Pye & Cochran, supra note 46, at 571.
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them may be warranted on the issue of eligibility standards because of
the impact this issue has on the professional community.
Insofar as responsiveness requires delegating authority, it may tend
in practice to undercut policysetting and thereby open the program to
political interference in some degree. If no delegation were permitted
and all policy were set by the Corporation, the program might be
almost totally insulated politically but seriously unresponsive to the
needs and desires of constituencies at the local level as well. It often
will be necessary to reconcile the requirements of responsiveness and
policysetting. For each issue alternatives must be sought out which
will minimize the tension between these two principles. 151
With respect to the division of responsibilities between governing
boards and staff attorneys, three major approaches have been suggested.
One, recently proposed in an OEO draft guideline, would be to give
governing boards a limited "oversight" function restricted to insuring
compliance by the staff attorneys with Corporation policies. The local
governing board would be precluded from infringing on the project
director's authority to "conduct operations .. .handle litigation or
manage personnel. 152 The American Bar Association has recom-
mended a second approach which would give local boards a "general
policymaking" function empowering them to "set broad guidelines
respecting the categories or kinds of clients" and to act as a "managing
or senior partner in a law firm," though abstaining from decisions
case by case, client by client."ia As a third approach, the Corporation
might give local boards a "case-by-case policymaking" function, allow-
ing them to set broad guidelines and make specific decisions on types
of clients or cases before they are accepted. The boards would also
have greater control over the hiring and firing of staff as well as de-
cisions on appeals and negotiations.
151. Theoretically, it might be argued, responsiveness should be fully compatible
with policysetting. Where authority is delegated, it should still be possible to achieve all
the elements of policysetting. See pp. 233-35 supra. The practical difficulty of doing so,
however, is reat. Almost inevitably, there will be some slippage-in articulation of
policy, pinpointing of responsibility or enforcement-as discretion is opened down the
line. The result may be some increased degree of vulnerability to political interference.
Insofar as increased responsiveness results in the program dealing flexibly with the most
urgent and genuine grievances of the client community, it raises the probability of op.
position from those whose interests are threatened.
152. Draft, Guidelines for Governing Boards of Legal Services Programs (unsigned
and undated). Several drafts of these guidelines were written in 1970, and were dis.
seminated for comment, but were never issued. Interview with Speaker, supra note 14.
153. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion No,
824, Aug. 9, 1970. See generally ABA CANONS oF PROFESSIONAL ETnics No. 5, EnIGAL
CONSIDaATIONS 5-1, 5-24, DisciPLIN AY RuLFs 5-101, 5-107 (1970).
280
Vol. 81: 231, 1971
The Legal Services Corporation and Political Interference
Confining the governing board to "oversight" of the staff attorneys
would seem to give the legal services lawyers more power over the pro-
gram than the impact-contribution analysis conducted above would
00justify.'"4 Though the governing board might choose the project direc-
tor, its policymaking powers would be emasculated. On the other hand,
permitting a case-by-case, client-by-client, consideration of policy by
the board would be more likely to open the governing board to political
interference1-5 A general policymaking function, as under the ABA's
suggestion, would seem preferable because it combines a measure of
responsiveness with the political insulation provided by prospective
policysetting.'r5
2. Eligibility
The need for policysetting is especially acute in dealing with the
issue of eligibility because under almost any proposed standard some
degree of policymaking authority will be delegated to lbcal governing
boards in order to cope with diverse local needs. Responsibility for
setting standards must be dearly delineated and the factors to be con-
sidered must be clearly set forth by the Corporation. The issue of
eligibility also involves critical claims to responsiveness because of the
tremendous impact of eligibility decisions on the client and profes-
sional communities. Depending on the eligibility standards adopted,
large numbers of the poor may be excluded from service, or private
attorneys may be damaged in their practice.
The issue of eligibility is normally understood to pertain only to
financial factors. The Corporation must face two issues: first, which
financial factors are to be considered and, second, whether and which
non-financial factors should also be part of the eligibility standard. In
the past, eligibility has been determined almost exclusively on the basis
of income: an individual's take-home pay or other income is measured
154. See p. 271 supra.
155. See pp. 258-59 supra.
156. Any of these options might be implemented through the use of uniform con-
tracts defining the relationship between the Corporation and governing boards, and
between the governing boards and staff attorneys. The common thread running through-
out the program's organization would then be one of contractual obligation. In the
past, grantees had virtually no right to a hearing in the event the OLS denied refunding.
Project attorneys were employees of their governing boards, but they frequently had no
contracts. Their rights and obligations in relation to the board, and their relationship
with clients, were undefined. A draft model contract was prepared recently by OLS
officials, but was never disseminated for comment, or formally adopted. Establishment
of contractual obligations would both assure elementary due process for projects and
attorneys, and make clear the rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties at
each level of the program.
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against a general income index of poverty. Standards based solely on
income, however, ignore the factor of cost-particularly variations in
cost for different kinds of legal services in different parts of the coun-
try.' 57 Financial factors other than income might be specified, such as
savings or cash on hand, equity in property, ability to borrow from
friends or relatives and debts or continuing payments or expected
medical expenses. The standard might also consider the total costs of
counsel: the probability of protracted litigation, the possibility of ap-
peals, the necessity for expert witnesses or special studies or other un-
usual evidence and the chances of success and of attorney fees and
court costs being charged to the opponent. Also, policy should be set
in a number of related areas including the eligibility of the "voluntary"
poor and the measure of "voluntariness," the eligibility of groups and
the determination of the adequacy of the group's resources and the
consideration to be given an individual whose case has been refused
by a number of private attorneys.
Under a standard based solely on reasonable financial need, the pro-
gram, operating with present or foreseeable levels of funding, could
not possibly serve all individuals unable to afford private legal assist-
ance. Among these individuals difficult eligibility choices will have to
be made. Financial factors alone will not suffice as criteria. Non-
financial factors to be considered might include the ability of the indi-
vidual to obtain employment, marital status, whether the individual
has previously been a client and, perhaps most important, the nature
of the problem and the potential significance of the case both to the
individual and to the client community.' 8"
157. The income poverty index commonly used by projects was sharply criticized
by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare: "testimony before the com.
mittee has emphasized anew the arbitrary nature of the poverty index." SENATE Rziowr,
supra note 1, at 5-7. This index, as computed by the Social Security Administration, is
presently set at S3,970 for a family of four. Id. As Miss Mollie Orshansky of the Social
Security Administration told the Committee, the basis of the poverty index is an
assumption, derived from a 1960-61 survey conducted by the Labor Department and
Agriculture Department, which "suggested that the food expenditures of average families
of three or more represented about one-third of their money income after taxes." 1971
Senate Hearings, supra note 106, pt. 1, at 70. Although other agencies such as the
Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Labor Department have also designed indexes, the
Social Security Administration index was made the official figure for use by Government
agencies by direction of the Bureau of the Budget, in Budget Circular No. A-46, Trans.
mittal Memorandum No. 9, Aug. 29, 1969. This index consists of the 1963 base year
index adjusted annually only for price changes reflected in the Consumer Price Index,
and with a smaller farm-non-farm differential. 1971 Senate Hearings, supra.
158. Although the legislation provides that the Corporation must give "priority" to
individuals whose means are least adequate (The Bill § 1006(a)(8)), the legislative history
of the program strongly suggests that Congress contemplates including the "near poor"
for service to some extent. The House Committee on Education and Labor said that
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Several policy options are available to the Corporation. First, it
might set standards of financial eligibility at so low a level that no
other policy would be necessary: with means standards set very low,
the program would be able to serve all who qualified. Such a standard
would fully define policy and avoid the need for articulating further
responsibility at other levels in the program, but it would prevent
projects from responding to diverse local conditions and from meeting
the needs of those generally considered to be poor.
Second, the Corporation might set financial standards sufficiently
high that not all legally eligible individuals could be served, but define
no further criteria for decisions among such individuals. Governing
boards would be required to establish such criteria but would have
full discretion in doing so. Such a policy would augment responsive-
ness to local conditions but might undermine policysetting: the dele-
gation of authority, even if pinpointed, would be extraordinarily
broad. There would be substantial variation among programs on eli-
gibility decisions. Moreover, the Corporation would have no criteria
by which to evaluate such policysetting. Such a policy, in practice,
might be indistinguishable from the one currently used-that is to
say, no policy at all.
As a third option, favored here, the Corporation might set financial
factors as outer limits, but mandate the criteria to be applied, in some
order of importance, in deciding who would be served first among
those who qualify. Local governing boards would have discretion within
limits circumscribed by such criteria. Financial factors to be considered
might include those contained in the Administration's original bill,
i.e., the assets and income level of the client; the fixed debts, medical
expenses and other factors which affect the client's ability to pay; the
size of the client's family; the cost of living in the particular locality;
and other factors related to financial inability to afford legal coun-
sel.159 Those least able to afford private counsel might be given prefer-
it was "interested in the possibility of legal services being extended to the so.called
.near poor'" and mandated the Corporation to study "how best this can be accom-
plished." HoUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 33. The Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare recommended that the legislation authorize the program to accept such
clients and charge them. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1. at 36.
159. H.R. 8163, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 905(a)(2) (1971) and S. 1769, 92d Cong.. 1st Sess.
§ 905(a)(2). These provisions were not included in the legislation approved by Congress.
S. 2007, which the President vetoed. The Administration's bill contained a number of
other important provisions rejected by Congress, as a result of opposition from the
bi-partisan coalition of legal services supporters, and thus differed significantly froin
the final version passed. It would have provided, for example, for (i) negotiation by
the Corporation on behalf of clients with federal agencies in order to avid litigation
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ence. But non-financial factors should also be considered, such as the
significance of the case to the local community or a specified number
of rejections of the case by private attorneys. This third option would
seem preferable, since it would both satisfy the requirements of policy-
setting and allow substantial flexibility for responsiveness to constitu-
encies at the local level.
3. Services
The issue of services, as indicated above, °0  presents the Corporation
with essentially two questions: what distinction is to be drawn between
permissible and impermissible services, and what priorities will be
established among permissible services? Answering the first question
amounts to setting the outer boundaries of legitimate activity for legal
services attorneys, which is comparable to defining financial parameters
for eligibility. Though the proposed legislation would incorporate the
two major existing restrictions, relating to criminal representation and
lobbying, the Corporati6n would presumably have authority to adopt
others if a sufficient need arose.
Answering the second question involves applying criteria of prefer-
ence or need to establish a ranking among the types of permissible
services. Since the proposed statute would not specify the categories
of services to be ranked, or even the level where the decision should
be made, the Corporation would have broad discretion to do so. The
scarcity of the program's resources makes the decision particularly im-
portant, since only a few of the potential priorities may be served.
In determining the extent of authority to be delegated to governing
boards on these two questions, the Corporation has available a number
of possible approaches. One would be to retain total power over policy
with respect to both questions, setting detailed guidelines on imper-
missible activities and strict requirements for allocation of attorney
time. A second approach would be to delegate maximum authority to
the local governing boards on both questions, merely repeating the
legislative language regarding permissible activities, while setting no
requirements whatever on priorities. As a third approach, the Corpora-
tion might leave maximum discretion to the governing boards on per-
(§ 904(b)(3)) (ii) establishment of guidelines for a system of review of appeals in indi-
vidual cases (§ 905(a)(8)) and (iii) a prohibition on any grants or contracts with "public
interest law firms" (§ 905(b)(3)).
160. See pp. 253-56 supra.
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missible activities but set detailed requirements as to the use of the
projects' resources and attorney time. Finally, the Corporation might
set detailed guidelines on impermissible activities and define certain
categories of permissible services, but leave substantial discretion to
local governing boards to decide priorities among these categories.
A strong argument may be made for the Corporation setting policy
on permissible types of services, as under the first and fourth ap-
proaches, on the grounds that the reasons for judging one type of
activity permissible and another impermissible should apply to all
programs. Such reasons might be, for example, the unethical nature
of certain services, the extravagant expense involved, or congressional
intent. It can be argued equally strongly that substantial authority on
priorities should be delegated in order to allow for maximum respon-
siveness to the particular problems of clients and local conditions. The
fourth approach thus seems preferable to the first, because it would
delegate discretion for setting priorities among clearly defined cate-
gories of service within parameters of permissibility set by the Cor-
poration.
4. Other Aspects of Policysetting
In dealing with issues of eligibility and services, the Corporation
would be well-advised to build effective mechanisms for reviewing all
decisions of local governing boards and evaluating them in terms of
established policies. Astonishingly, no such mechanism has existed in
the history of legal services. Procedures should be established, as a
number of observers have suggested, for review and approval of guide-
lines established by local boards.101 These procedures, along with the
standards set by the national Corporation, should be published offi-
cially in the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations. In
addition, there might be procedures for periodic spot checking by the
Corporation to insure that the policies established by the local board
and the Corporation are being followed. Reporting requirements with
respect to specific forms of data, including client "profiles" in terms
161. See Curtis E. von Kann & Gary Fontana, A Model Brief for the Proposition
that A Trial Judge Has No Power to Conduct A Collateral Inquiry Into A Civil Litigant's
Eligibility for Representation by A Legal Services Attorney, Aug. 13, 1971. See also
Letter from Curtis von Kann, attorney, to Jason Newman, Special Counsel to the
Director of OLS, Sept. 3, 1971. The Management Information System (MIS), the OLS'
main device for obtaining data from projects on a regular basis, provides only -.ery
limited types of information; many projects have failed to file MIS reports, and relatively
rarely has OLS demanded them.
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of eligibility factors, should be a part of the application and funding
process. The evaluation system should be greatly strengthened to pro-
vide for periodic assessments of project performance by the staff and
board of the project as well as by outside teams. Visits by outside
teams should be arranged for adequate periods of time, and the teams
should include individuals capable of providing advice and technical
assistance to the project. Data should be compiled uniformly for the
program as a whole so that long range trends can be identified. Finally,
the Corporation might also consider establishing administrative mech-
anisms to consider complaints about local project decisions with respect
to eligibility, services or any other issue. Such a mechanism might pro-
vide, for example, quick review of complaints by a party opponent or
another person aggrieved by a local board decision to provide, or re-
fuse, representation to a particular individual.
IV. Conclusion
A need for more adequate policysetting and responsiveness has been
frequently expressed by clients, legal services attorneys and govern-
ment officials. The time to fulfill that need is now, since the program
will probably be governed soon by a new, independent structure. The
legal services program has earned a measure of public acceptance and
even enthusiasm. Even now, however, it is not free of the threat of
political interference. This threat can be expected to grow as the pro-
gram gains in power and fulfills its immense potential. As a Corpora-
tion no less than a branch of the government, legal services is entering
a new time of testing.
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